IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-S) 


1.0 


I.I 


illi    12.5 


1^    I 


i 


2.2 


i  -^  IIIIM 

I.  u 

Ill  1.8 


IL25  i  1.4   ill  1.6 


6" 


75 


A 


^^J^? 
^'#^^'^ 


Photographic 

Sdences 

Corporation 


33  WiST  MAIN  STRKT 

WCBSriR.N.Y.  14580 

(716)  872-4503 


m: 


<^rS 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHIVI/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this 
copy  which  may  be  bibliographically  unique, 
which  may  alter  any  of  the  images  in  the 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
the  usual  mu  hod  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


D 


D 


n 


n 


D 


n 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I    Covers  damaged/ 


Couverture  endommagde 


Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaur^e  et/ou  pellicul6e 


I      I    Cover  title  missing/ 


Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 


I      I    Coloured  maps/ 


Cartes  gdographiques  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 


I      I    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 

Tight  binding  may  cpuse  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  reliure  serr^e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  intdrieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages  blanches  ajouties 
lors  d'une  restauration  apparaissent  dans  le  texte, 
mais,  lorsque  cela  6tait  possible,  ces  pages  n'ont 
pas  6t6  filmies. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commentaires  suppl6mentaires; 


L'Institut  a  microfiim6  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  M  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
de  cet  exempiaire  qui  sont  peut-dtre  uniques  du 
point  de  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvant  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  mdthode  normale  de  filmage 
sont  indiquis  ci-dessous. 


□    Coloured  pages/ 
Pages  de  couleur 

□    Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommagdes 

I      I    Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 


D 


D 


Pages  restauries  et/ou  pellicul6es 

Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxe( 
Pages  d6color6es,  tachetdes  ou  piqu^es 

Pages  detached/ 
Pages  d6tach6es 

Showthrough/ 
Transparence 


r~p\    Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
I      I    Pages  detached/ 
ryi    Showthrough/ 


I      I    Quality  of  print  varies/ 


Quality  indgale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  material/ 
Comprend  du  materiel  supplementaire 


I      I    Only  edition  available/ 


Seule  Edition  disponible 

Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refiimed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Les  pages  totalement  ou  partiellement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  6t6  filmdes  A  nouveau  de  facon  d 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 


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to 


Th 
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fill 


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be 
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fin 
sic 
or 


Th 
shi 
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This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  film6  au  taux  de  reduction  indiquA  ci-dessous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


26X 


30X 


^ 


12X 


16X 


20X 


24X 


28X 


32X 


tails 
du 

idifier 
une 
nage 


Th«  copy  filmed  h«r«  has  b—n  raproducsd  thank* 
to  th*  ganoroBity  of: 

Library  Oiviiion 

Provincial  Archives  of  Britiih  Columbia 

Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
poMibIa  contidaring  tha  condition  and  lagibility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  spacifications. 


Original  copiaa  r.t  printad  papar  covars  ara  filmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  laa;  pcga  with  a  printad  or  illustratad  imprat- 
•ion.  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriate .  All 
othar  original  copias  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustratad  impras- 
sion,  and  anding  on  tha  last  paga  with  a  printad 
or  illustratad  imprassion. 


Tha  last  racordad  frama  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  ^^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  ara  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


L'exemplaira  film*  fut  reproduit  grice  i  la 
gAnAroait*  da: 

Library  Division 

Provincial  Archives  of  British  Columbia 

Las  images  suivantea  ont  AtA  raproduites  avac  la 
plua  grand  soin,  compta  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattet*  da  raxemplaira  film«,  et  en 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmaga. 

Lea  axemplairas  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  ImprimAe  sont  filmAs  en  commenQant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
darniAre  paga  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration.  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  filmis  en  commen^ant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  derniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaltra  sur  la 
darnlAre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — ^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE  ",  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  peuvent  Atre 
filmAs  A  des  taux  de  reduction  diffArents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA.  il  est  film*  A  partir 
de  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite. 
et  de  haut  en  bas.  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mAthode. 


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1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

I 


THE 


OREGON   CONTROVERSY 


REVIEWED. 


IN  FOUR  LETTERS. 


BT 


A  FRIEND  OF  THE  ANGLO-SAXONS. 


AT) 

<«^' 

^ 

NEW-YORK : 

LEAVITT, 

TROW,    AND    COMPANY, 

194  Broadway. 

1846. 

tl  ^ 


NOTICE. 

These  letters  were  prepared  for  the  press  in  their  present  shape,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  notes,  wiien  the  news  by  the  British  steamer  of  February  4th  arrived. 
The  aspect  of  the  Oregon  controversy,  after  the  arrival  of  this  very  pacific  news, 
discouraged  the  writer  from  publishing  at  that  time.  All  danger  seemed  to  be  past, 
and  tile  community  showed  manifest  symptoms  of  being  surfeited  with  the  subject  of 
Oregon.  Recently  these  letters  have  been  shown  to  an  intelligent  friend,  who  has 
strongly  advised  their  publication,  even  at  this  late  hour,  on  the  ground  that  a  large 
portion  of  the  matter  contained  in  them,  has  not  been  presented  to  the  public — 
at  least  in  connection  with  this  subject — and  that  much  of  it  possesses  interest  in- 
dependent of  the  question  by  which  it  has  been  elicited. 

Even  the  review  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  argument  on  the  Spanish  title,  in  the  sec- 
ond letter,  though  now  perhaps  unnecessary  with  the  majority  of  thinking  men, 
may  still  be  useful  by  reconciling  some  part  of  the  community  to  the  only  terms  on 
which  the  controversy,  as  it  appears  to  me,  can  be  peaceably  settled. 

It  may  also  be  stated  as  a  reason  for  now  soliciting  attention  to  this  subject, 
that  the  question  at  present  seems  farther  from  a  final  settlement,  than  it  did  at  the 
time  when  these  letters  were  first  ready  for  the  press.  Indeed  it  appears  at  the 
present  moment  scarcely  possible  that  the  Oregon  controversy  should  be  finally  set- 
tled under  the  present  administration.  This  delay  is  much  to  be  regretted,  especial- 
ly after  the  discussion  of  the  subject  has  been  advanced  so  far,  and  at  the  expense 
of  so  much  irritation  and  alarm  to  both  countries.  If  in  the  mean  time,  whilst  this 
question  is  made  the  sport  of  party  politics,  and  the  fieelings  of  the  community  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  held  in  a  state  of  feverish  excitement,  any  collision 
should  occur  between  the  settlers  of  the  respective  nations  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  the  consequences  might  be  very  serious.  The  reasoning  and  influen- 
tial part  of  the  public  ought  not  therefore  to  dismiss  this  subject  from  their  thoughts, 
as  if  all  danger  were  past,  because  the  Senate,  backed  by  the  enlightened  part  of  the 
community,  has  interposed  its  influence  to  prevent  the  hasty  adoption  of  a  hostile 
course  of  action. 

For  these  and  other  similar  reasons  the  writer  of  these  pages  has  concluded, 
even  under  the  disadvantage  of  coming  before  a  community  wearied  with  the  agita- 
tion of  this  subject,  to  submit  his  opinions  of  the  Oregoi.  controversy  to  the  public, 
with  the  hope  of  helping  to  disseminate  correct  and  reasonable  views  of  this  much 
disputed  question,  and  of  thus  subserving  the  best  interests  of  his  native  and  of  his 
adopted  country. 

Since  the  above  sentences  were  written,  the  President's  late  message  to  the 
Senate,  recommending  an  increase  of  the  military  and  naval  force  of  the  country, 
has  been  received.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  influence  which  this  message 
may  ultimately  exert  on  the  pending  controversy,  the  document  cannot  fail  to  ex- 
cite a  deeper  interest  than  has  been  felt  for  some  weeks  past  in  the  matters  dis- 
cussed in  these  sheets.  The  present  aspect  of  our  relations  with  Great  Britain 
calls  loudly  for  the  renewed  and  anxious  attention  of  the  community. 


#,: 


I 


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1 


THE  OBEGON  CONTROVERSY. 


LETTER  I. 

New-York,  Fehruray,  1846. 
Dear  Sik  : 

In  compliance  with  your  request  that  I  would  commit  to  writing 
the  views  which  I  presented  to  you  in  our  late  conversation  on  the 
Oregon  controversy,  I  propose  in  the  following  letters  to  give  you  a 
dispasi-  onate  and  impartial  statement  of  the  principles  on  which  this 
controvc  ^y  ought,  in  my  opinion,  to  be  decided, — emi  -acing  a  re- 
view, so  far  as  necessary  to  my  purpose,  of  the  grounds  on  which 
the  respective  parties  rest  their  opposing  claims  to  the  territory  in 
dispute.  This  will  be  followed  by  some  remarks  upon  the  course  of 
policy  recently  pursued  by  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  in 
reference  to  this  unhappy  controversy,  and  some  notice  of  the  dan- 
gers and  of  the  calamities  into  which  it  may  sooner  or  later  plunge 
this  countr^y,  as  well  as  Great  Britain,  if  prosecuted  in  the  same  un- 
fair spirit  and  with  the  same  arrogant  temper,  which  seem  to  have 
influenced  our  public  councils  in  reference  to  foreign  affairs,  since 
the  accession  of  the  present  administration. 

You  will  not  think  me  less  competent  to  the  impartial  perform- 
ance of  this  task  on  account  of  my  position  in  reference  to  both 
countries;  or  because  I  make  no  pretensions  of  exclusive  patriot- 
ism. I  pretend  not  to  feel  such  a  love  for  any  particular  country, 
as  is  inconsistent  with  a  proper  regard  for  the  rights  and  for  the  hap- 
piness of  other  nations.  I  consider  much  of  the  vaunted  patriotism 
of  our  times  as  nothing  better  than  a  more  disguised  selfishness,  and 
as  often  productive  of  evils,  which,  if,  on  the  one  hand,  of  less  fre- 
quent occurrence,  on  the  other,  when  they  do  occur,  extend  much 
more  widely  their  malign  influence.  I  heartily  deprecate  as  unsound 
morality  the  last  clause  of  the  celebrated  exclamation,  "  Our  coun- 
try, our  whole  country,  and  nothing  but  our  country^'      The  first 


and  second  clauses  cannot  be  too  highly  applauded ;  but  the  third 
I  have  always  considered  a  great  blemish  on  an  otherwise  excellent 
and  appropriate  formula  of  American  patriotism.  The  sentiment, 
— "and  nothing  but  our  country,"  unfortnnfitely  needs  no  inculca- 
cation  any  where,  and  particularly  among  us.  It  is  to  be  feared 
that  this  is  the  part — this  last  unchristian  sentiment — which  we  are 
most  likely  to  adopt,  and  to  push,  even  beyond  the  intention  of  the 
orator,  not  only  to  the  exclusion  of  the  re.st  of  mankind  from  sharing 
in  our  benevolent  wishes  and  our  benevolent  efforts,  but  to  the  adop- 
tion of  hostile  feelings  to  the  nations  with  which  it  is  both  our  inter- 
est and  our  duty  to  cultivate  a  friendly  intercourse. 

Perhaps  I  do  not  view  this  subject  from  exactly  the  same  point  as 
a  native  of  the  United  States  would  view  it.  This  you  have  been 
pleased  to  consider  rather  as  a  recommendation  of  my  opinions,  than 
a  disparagement  of  them  ;  as  my  position  is,  you  allege,  favorable 
to  impartiality.  You  hold  that,  at  all  events,  it  may  be  useful  to 
have  the  conclusions  of  different  classes  of  inquirers  on  this  subject. 
We  have  the  views  of  native  Americans  and  of  Britons,  and  why 
not  of  those  who,  occupying  an  intermediate  position,  are  likely  to 
be  exempted  from  some  of  the  strongest  prejudices  of  both. 

I  was  born,  as  you  know,  a  British  subject,  and  spent  my  life 
till  manhood  under  the  protection  of  British  law.  Yet  the  Inrger 
and  more  active  part  of  mv  years  has  been  spent  in  this  republic. 
Here  I  have  many  dear  fric.ids,  whose  interests  and  prosperity  are 
inseparably  connected  with  the  interests  and  prosperity  of  this  re- 
public. I  cannot,  therefore,  but  feel  alive  tojhese  interests — to  this 
prosperity.  Nor  am  I  less  alive  to  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  true 
honor  of  the  country  ;  though,  as  to  the  question  wherein  true  hon- 
or consists,  I  may  differ  widely  from  some  of  the  noisy  professed 
patriots  and  demagogues  of  the  day.  In  regard  of  a  nation,  as  in 
regard  of  an  individual,  I  consider  it  more  honorable  and  more 
magnanimous  to  cede  some  portion  of  a  just  claim,  when  the  party 
to  which  the  cession  is  made  does  not  manifest  an  intention  to  prac- 
tice deliberate  imposition,  than  to  obtain  more  than  is  just,  whether 
by  obstinacy,  by  importunity,  or  by  blustering  and  bullying.  In  a 
word,  if  wrong  is  done — especially  injury  unaccompanied  with  in- 
sult— I  count  it  more  honorable  to  be  the  sufferer  than  the  aggressor. 

But  at  the  same  time  that  Ifeel  thus  interested  in  the  pro.'^perity 
and  in  the  reputation  of  this  country,  I  feel  also  a  very  strong  in- 
terest in  the  land  of  my  birth.     I  have  left  in  that  land  many  dear 


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and  kind  friends,  in  whose  joys  and  sorrows  1  sympathize,  whose 
prosperity  and  adversity  I  c!*nnot  contemplate  with  indifference. 
Nor  do  I  wish  to  disguise  the  fact  that  I  still  feel  a  deep  respect  for 
the  institutions  of  the  British  empire,  and  that  I  rejoice  in  Britain's 
prosperity  and  glory,  and  would  grieve  for  her  calamities  or  her  dis- 
grace. And  can  any  considerate  man,  who  really  feels  within  his 
heart  that  love  of  country,  which  is  so  often  on  the  lips  of  dema- 
gogues, blame  me  for  this?  What  would  be  thought  of  the  Ameri- 
can, who  in  a  foreign  land  could  forget,  abuse,  or  profess  to  hate  his 
country,  however  identified  his  interests  might  become  with  those 
of  another  nation  ?  Is  a  man  incapable  of  becoming  a  useful  citizen 
of  this  country  without  repudiating  the  land  of  his  birth — its  insti- 
tutions, people,  &c.,  by  wholesale,  and  without  discrimination? 
May  not  he,  who,  holding  that  different  institutions  suit  different 
conditions  of  human  society,  admits  the  excellence  of  the  institu- 
tions of  his  adopted  country  without  disparaging  those  of  the  place 
of  his  birth,  contrfbute  to  the  furtherance  of  the  highest  interests  of 
the  country,  which  he  has  chosen  for  his  home,  and  yield  faithful 
allegiance  to  its  laws  and  constitution?  These  interrogatories  sug- 
gest matter  of  reflection  perhaps  worthy  of  more  consideration  than 
they  usually  receive  in  this  country.  The  most  trustworthy  citizen 
may  not  always  be  the  one  that  makes  the  loudest  professions  of 
exclusive  patriotism  in  reference  to  the  country  of  his  choice,  and 
of  hatred  to  the  institutions  under  which  he  was  born.  If  it  should 
appear  that  such  professions  are  available  and  necessary  to  propitiate 
the  favor  of  those  around  them,  the  less  scrupulous  will  find  them  a 
cheap  means  of  recommending  themselves.  The  emigrant  least 
v^orthji  of  the  esteem  both  of  the  country  which  he  has  forsaken  and 
that  to  which  he  has  transferred  his  allegiance,  may  sometimes  be 
found  the  most  profusely  lavish  of  these  compliments  to  the  national 
vanity. 

But  not  to  talk  too  much  of  myself,  let  me  say  in  one  word, 
that  I  feel  a  sincere  desire  for  the  happiness  of  both  countries — the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.  I  believe  there  are  many  natives 
of  this  country,  who,  at  the  same  time  that  they  feel  the  most  loyal 
attachment  to  their  own  country,  share  with  me  this  sincere  desire 
for  the  happiness  of  the  people  of  the  British  isles.  Nor  are  the  in- 
terests of  the  two  great  Anglo-Saxon  nations  on  either  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  in  my  opinion,  so  opposed  that  I  cannot  consistently  love 
them  both.     On  the  contrary  I  believe  these  interests  to  be  closely 


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entwined  together — more  closely,  perhaps,  than  those  of  any  two 
independent  countries,  which  have  existed  since  the  world  began. 
One  obvious  measure  of  these  common  interests  is  the  extent  of 
their  commerce  with  each  other — an  extent  which  has  never  before 
been  reached  by  the  commercial  intercourse  of  any  other  nations. 
Need  I  advert  to  a  common  religion,  a  common  language,  a  common 
literature,  common  principles  of  jurisprudence,  and  the  bonds  of 
affinity  and  of  friendship  which  unite  so  large  a  proportion  of  the 
citizens  of  both  countries  1 

I  do  not  say  that  a  cause  might  not  arise  to  justify  one  of  these 
nations,  occupying  both  at  present  a  position  so  commanding  and 
conspicuous  among  the  powers  of  the  civilized  world,  in  waging 
war  against  the  other.  I  do  not  advocate  the  doctrine  of  absolute 
non-resistance  to  injury.  A  tame  submission  to  wanton  aggression 
and  insult  I  believe  to  be  both  dishonorable  and  dangerous  to  a 
nation.  A  manly  resistance  to  injury  is  eventually  more  serviceable 
even  to  the  aggressor.  A  proper  self-respect  and  a  dignified  resent- 
ment of  wrong  and  designed  insult,  as  well  as  a  scrupulous  regard 
for  the  rights  and  feelings  of  others,  are  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
advantageous  maintenance  of  amicable  relations  between  communi- 
ties, as  well  dividuals. 

But  sure  .^  ery  man  will  admit,  that  it  is  no  small  cause  which 
ought  to  endanger  the  peace  of  two  nations  connected  as  are  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.  Nothing  but  persistence  in  wrong 
— wilful  wrong — or  manifestly  intended  and  deliberately  avowed  in- 
sult on  the  part  of  the  one,  would  justify  the  other  in  having  recourse 
to  arms. 

That  the  controversy  about  the  Oregon  territory  ought  not  to 
lead  to  war,  and  cannot  lead  to  war  without  the  most  flagrant  mis- 
conduct on  the  part  of  the  American  government  and  people,  I  ex- 
pect to  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  any  reasonable  man  like  yourself. 
Great  Britain  has  done  much  to  clear  herself  of  blame  for  the  con- 
sequences of  this  controversy,  by  her  earnest  and  persevering  endeav- 
ors to  have  it  settled,  before  the  question  should,  by  the  natural  pro- 
gress of  human  affairs,  become  more  difficult  of  adjustment,  and  by 
declaring  finally  her  willingness  to  submit  the  subject  in  dispute  to  an 
arbitrator.  Disinterested  parties  will,  on  the  one  hand,  infer  from  the 
acts  of  Great  Britain  that  she  is  desirous  of  maintaining  a  good 
understanding  between  the  tvo  nations,  and  that  she  is  willing  to 
accept  what  a  disinterested  umpire  may  consider  justice ;  and,  on 


■]!!< 


■^. 


I 


■0' 


t 


I 


.'? 


■■'% 


ihe  other  hand,  that  the  government  of  this  country  is  willing  to 
hazard  the  awful  convsequences  of  war  for  a  mere  trifle,  and  is  at  the 
same  time  so  conscious  of  the  unreasonableness  of  its  claims,  that 
it  dares  not  submit  them  to  arbitration. 

The  reasons  commonly  alleged  for  refusing  submission  to  arbi- 
tration do  not  mend  the  matter.  They  are  only  calculated  to  place 
the  cause  of  this  country  in  a  worse  light.  They  cannot  but  be 
considered  by  unprejudiced  and  intelligent  foreigners,  as  utterly 
groundless,  and  at  the  same  time  manifestly  invidious,  and  even 
slanderous.  They  are  insulting  to  foreign  sovereignties.  The 
princes  of  Europe,  are,  forsooth,  all  so  very  partial  to  Great  Britain, 
that  we  cannot  trust  a  matter  of  dispute  between  her  and  us,  to  their 
arbitration !  What  was  the  result  of  the  arbitration  of  Russia  in 
reference  to  the  slaves  deported  from  the  Southern  States  during  the 
war  of  1812?  Was  it  more  agreeable  to  the  wishes  and  consonant 
to  the  expectations  of  Great  Britain,  than  to  those  of  the  United 
States?  And  are  Great  Britain  and  Russia  at  the  present  moment 
on  more  amicable  terms  than  when  this  arbitration  was  effected? — 
Were  the  courts  of  St.  Petersburg  and  London  ever  more  cordial 
than  during  the  period  which  followed  their  successful  co-operation 
in  checking  the  ambitious  projects  of  Napoleon  ?  And  did  this 
cordiality  prevent  the  emperor  Alexander  from  doing  full  justice  to 
this  country,  and  much  more  than  what  her  opponent  and  his  most 
powerful  and  .nost  generous  ally  considered  justice? 

The  private  individual  who  would  refuse  the  reference  of  a  dis- 
puted claim  to  arbitration  on  such  shallow  pretences,  would  draw 
suspicion  on  his  own  integrity,  as  well  as  display  distrust  of  the  jus- 
tice of  his  cause.  By  advancing  this  plea  of  the  danger  of  submit- 
ting our  claims  to  the  arbitration  of  a  government  different  from  our 
own,  do  we  not  tacitly  admit  that  we  ourselves  would  not  do  justice 
were  we  chosen  to  arbitrate  betweem  a  monarchical  government  and 
a  republic  like  our  own  ?  May  we  not  be  suspected  of  measuring 
other  governments  by  our  own  foot-measure? 

If  we  impeach  the  justice  of  other  powers  in  the  manner  in 
which  we  have  done  in  this  case,  we  may  soon  place  ourselves  in 
such  a  position  towards  them,  as  to  have  just  grounds  to  fear  that 
in  resentment  of  the  gratuitous  declaration  of  our  hostility  to  their 
institutions,  and  distrustof  their  impartiality  and  integrity,  they  may 
be  led  to  treat  us  according  to  our  own  jealous,  mistrustful  appre- 
hensions. What  man  of  sound  judgment  believes  that,  before  the  late 


8 

censorious  and  imp»-udent  remarks  of  our  Executive  on  the  conduct 
of  Louis  Philippe  and  his  cabinet,  thL  dispute  about  Oregon  might 
not  have  been  submitted  to  him  with  the  fullest  assurance  that  he 
would  have  zealously  and  honorably  endeavored  to  do  justice  to  both 
parties  ?  I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  he  would  do  so  still,  if 
he  could  be  induced  to  undertake  the  task.  This  has  been  render- 
ed  improbable  by  our  own  unjustifiable  conduct  towards  him. 

In  my  next  letter,  I  will  proceed  to  the  direct  examination  of 
the  matter  in  controversy,  and  the  claims  advanced  by  the  parties. 

Youis,  &.C. 


P.  S. — Since  writing  the  last  paragraphs  of  the  above  letter,  the 
public  has  been  put  in  possession  of  the  correspondence  between 
Mr.  Pakenham  and  Mr.  Buchanan  since  the  meeting  of  Congress. 
By  this  correspondence,  it  appears  that  Mr.  Pakenham  has  twice 
repeated  the  offer  to  refer  the  matter  in  dispute  between  the  two  na- 
tions to  arbitration  ;  and  that  he  has  endeavored  to  accommodate 
his  offer,  in  every  way  that  he  possibly  could,  to  the  views  of  Mr. 
Buchanan.  To  remove  the  objection  against  a  reference  to  a  sove- 
reign or  a  state,  he  has  proposed  to  commit  the  controversy  to  the 
adjudication  of  a  mixed  commission,  &/C.  But  all  in  vain — every 
proposition  rejected  peremptorily.  Many  of  the  remarks  made  above 
apply  with  greatly  increased  force  to  the  conduct  of  our  govern- 
ment in  these  recent  transactions.  What  reason  can  Mr.  Paken- 
ham have  to  expect  that  any  other  offer  which  he  might  make,  short 
of  surrendering  every  claim  to  any  part  of  the  disputed  territory, 
would  meet  with  a  different  reception?  Is  it  reasonable  to  hope 
that  he  will  subject  himself  to  another  similar  repulse  ?  or  that  he 
is  likely  to  offer  any  thing,  save  a  declared  ultimatum,  to  be  follow- 
ed with  at  least  an  implied  defiance,  and  possibly  a  suspension  of 
diplomatic  intercourse?  May  all  such  apprehensions  prove  utterly 
unfounded,  I  pray,  for  the  sake  of  humanity,  and  the  dearest  inte- 
rests of  political  and  religious  freedom.  If  an  appeal  to  arms  should 
now  be  the  result  of  this  controversy,  not  only  all  intelligent  and 
imp..rtial  men  in  other  nations  will,  without  hesitation,  attach  the 
blame  to  Mr.  Polk's  obstinacy ;  but  in  this  country,  all  men  of  mod- 
eration, candor,  respectability,  all  the  lovers  of  upright  dealing,  as 
well  as  the  lovers  of  peace,  will  charge  the  whole  blame  to  their  own 
government.  It  may  be  safely  predicted  that  the  war  would  now  be 
the  most  unpopular  that  ever  has  been  waged, — and  especially  un- 


M 


I 


9 

popular  amongst  that  class  of  men  who  alone  can  supply  the  sincwH 
of  war.  Mr.  Pakenham  seems  to  have  succeeded,  if  hostilities  there 
shall  be  on  account  of  this  question,  in  throwing  all  the  odium  on 
the  government  of  this  country. 


LETTER  II.  • 

Dear  Sir  : 

In  the  conversation  to  which  I  alluded  in  my  last  letter,  I  en- 
deavored to  maintain  that  the  views  commonly — I  fear  too  gene- 
rally— entertained  by  the  citizens  of  this  country,  in  regard  of 
our  claims  to  the  Oregon,  are  erroneous,  and  altogether  unrea- 
sonable. These  erroneous  views — these  unrr^,  /  onable  claims — 
are  the  great  obstacle  to  a  peaceful  adjusfnunt  of  the  contro- 
versy. And,  if  so,  it  is  the  duty  of  every  individuti),  in  conversation 
or  through  the  press,  to  contribute  according  to  his  abilities  to 
enlighten  public  opinion  on  this  very  imporlanl  subject — impor- 
(.mt,  I  mean,  in  reference  to  its  possible  results — and  to  endeavor 
to  inculcate  sober  and  moderate  views,  in  place  of  those  which  at 
present  prevail. 

As  soon  as  we  had  purchased  the  claims  of  Spain  to  the  territory 
west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  above  the  forty-second  degree  of 
North  Latitude,  all  our  makers  of  maps  and  compilers  of  school 
geographies,  took  immediate  possession  of  the  whole  territory.  In- 
stead of  stating  the  truth,  that  the  title  to  this  region  was  a  subject 
of  controversy  between  Great  Britain  and  this  country,  they  ex- 
hibited the  territory  to  the  whole  rising  generation,  as  an  un- 
doubted and  indisputable  possession  of  the  United  States.  This 
course  was,  no  doubt,  deemed  by  these  parties  both  patriotic 
and  politic.  But  the  results,  it  is  to  be  feared,  may  prove  that, 
like  many  other  acts  of  low  cunning  and  spurious  patriotism,  it 
was  as  much  opposed  to  sound  policy,  as  it  was  to  a  manly  and  up- 
right course  of  procedure.  Nothing — considering  the  nature  of 
our  institutions — can  be  conceived,  more  calculated  to  lay  the  foun- 
dation for  a  misunderstanding,  and  eventually  a  quarrel  between 
the  two  nations  interested  in  the  territory — nothing  more  calcu- 
lated to  render  this  misunderstanding  difficult  to  be  satisfactorilj 
adjusted. 


10 


This  unwarrantable  step  of  the  map-makers  and  geographers,  has 
now  been  followed  up  by  the  formal  declaration  of  our  executive, 
that  this  country  possesses  an  undoubted  title  to  the  whole  territory 
between  the   Roc'.y  Mountains  and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  from  Lat. 
42^  Ntirth  to  54^   40'.      This  claim  has  been  elaborately  defended 
by   Mr.  Buchanan,  especially  in  his  letter  to   Mr.   Pakenham    of 
August  30th,  1845.     To  this  letter,  Mr.  Pakenham,  I   presume, 
felt  himself  precluded  from  making  any  reply,   by  the  new  turn 
which  the  ntfotiatl'on   had   taken — by  the  withdrawal  of  the  com- 
promise offered  by  Mr.  Buchanan,    and   the  assertion  of  a  claim 
to   the  whole  Oregon  territory.     The  total  change  of  the  aspect  of 
the  negotiation,   no  doubt,    rendered  it  necessary  for  the  British 
minister  to  apply  to  his   government,  before  he  took   any  further 
step.      This  has  afforded   Mr.  Buchanan  the  opportunity,  (as   he 
must  have  foreseen  when  writing  this  letter  that  it  would,)  to  have 
the  last  word.     And  the  consequence  is,  that  Mr.  Buchanan's  argu- 
ments because  unanswered,  appear  to  the  great  bulk  of  the  com- 
munity unanswerable.     There  is  certainly  no  other  reason  for  think- 
ing Mr.  Buchanan's  reasoning  unanswerable;  though  the  greater 
portion  of  the  representatives  of  the  people,  (if  we  are  to  believe  the 
assertions  made  in  their  speeches,)  as  well  as  their  constituents, 
consider  it  absolutely  conclusive,  and  as  having  established  the  per- 
fect right  and  title  of  this  country  to  the  whole  region  along  the 
Pacific,  up  to  54°  40^     1  think  that  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  con- 
vince you,  or  any  intelligent  and  unprejudiced  man,  that  these  argu- 
ments of  Mr.   Buchanan,  however   plausible   and   ingenious,    are 
destitute  of  any  solid  foundation,  on  principles  of  national  law,  and, 
consequently,  utterly  inconclusive,  and  that  the  claim  of  the  United 
States  to  the  northern  portion  of  the  Oregon  territory  is  altogether 
unreasonable. 

It  does  not  appear,  from  the  published  correspondence,  that  this 
claim  had  ever  been  seriously  urged  by  this  government,  previous  to 
the  negotiation  between  Mr.  Pakenham  and  Mr.  Buchanan.  The 
utmost  demand  pressed  before  this,  was  that  ijatitude  49  North 
should  be  considered  as  the  boundary  between  the  United  States 
and  the  British  possessions  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  th« 
Pacific  Ocean.  It  will  be  observed  that  this  fact  affords  strong 
presumption  against  the  justice  of  the  claim.  For  precedmg  Ame- 
rican negotiators  in  this  controversy  were  not  very  likely  to  fail, 
either  of  perceiving  or  of  stating  the  whole  extent  of  the  just  claims 


'jii. 


I 

f 


I 


11 


of 


^ 


1 


of  their  country.  But  waiving  this  ohjection,  let  us  examine  the 
merits  of  this  claim,  unprejudiced  by  the  fact  that  it  was  never 
asserted — at  least  with  any  show  of  earnestness — by  this  govern- 
ment till  the  year  1845;  and  that  the  repeated  offers  to  accept  i  e 
49th  degree  of  north  latitude  as  a  boundary,  ought  to  ha\fe  been  con- 
sidered by  a  high-minded  government  as  for  ever  barring  the  intro- 
duction of  such  a  claim. 

I  confine  my  attention  almost  exclusively  to  the  claim  founded  on 
the  cession  of  the  Spanish  title  by  the  treaty  of  Florida ;  first,  be- 
cause this  Spanish  title  is  the  question  on  which  the  two  govern- 
ments are  most  opposed  in  their  views ;  and  secondly,  because  an 
examination  of  this  will  necessarily  lead  to  a  discussion  of  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  the  whole  controversy  ought  to  be,  and  might  be, 
readily  adjusted.  It  is  also  the  question  on  which  the  American 
public  appear  to  stand  most  in  need  of  illumination. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  incorrect  views  entertained  by  our  citi- 
zens at  present  of  our  claims  under  this  title — deepened  as  the  im- 
pressions on  the  public  mind  in  regard  of  this  matter  have  been  by 
the  correspondence  of  Mr.  Buchanan — are  the  most  serious  impedi- 
ment (at  least  with  honest  men)  to  the  speedy  amicable  settlement 
of  the  controversy  between  the  two  nations. 

Let  us  take  for  our  guide  the  laws  and  usages  of  nations  in 
regard  of  claims  to  unoccupied  countries,  and  by  the  help  of  these 
examine  the  title  of  Spain  to  the  disputed  territory  at  the  date  of 
the  treaty  of  Florida.  And  here,  waiving  all  argument  as  to  the 
claims  of  the  Indians  inhabiting  the  territory,  let  us  consider  the  coun- 
try as  if  it  had  been  a  desert  before  the  time  when  it  was  discovered 
by  Europeans — as  if  the  aborigines  had  no  rights  whatever  in  their 
native  wilds,  more  than  the  beasts  of  the  forests — since  this  is  the 
light  in  which  civilized  nations,  appealing  not  to  the  law  of  right, 
but  to  the  law  of  might,  have  thought  fit  to  regard  countries  peopled 
by  savages. 

The  original  title  of  Spain  to  the  sovereignty  of  all  the  countries 
on  the  Pacific  Ocean  is  founded  on  the  Bull  of  Pope  Alexander  VI., 
dated  May  4th,  1493;  in  which  his  Holiness  "  de  apostolicae  potcs- 
talis  pleniludine  "  grants  the  whole  of  the  New  World  to  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella,  sovereigns  of  Castile  and  Aragon.  Mr.  Buchanan 
ought,  in  c'Hidor  and  consistency,  to  have  noticed  this  much-cherished 
title  of  Spain  to  the  territory  in  dispute,  since  it  is  the  only  title  to 
wh'ch  his  language  will  apply,  when  he  says,  "  The  undersigned" 


18 


.1! 


(I  quote  from  the  letter  of  Aug.  30th,  1845,)  "  had  stated  as  a 
historical  and  striking  fact,  which  must  have  an  important  bearing 
against  the  claim  of  Great  Britain,  that  this  convention,  (the  Noot- 
ka,)  which  was  dictated  by  her  to  Spain,  contains  no  provision  im 
pairing  th6  ultimate  sovereignty  which  that  power  had  asserted  for 
nearly  three  centuries  over  the  whole  western  side  of  North  America 
as  far  north  as  the  61st  degree  of  latitude,  and  which  had  never 
been  seriously  questioned  by  any  European  nation.'*  Under  what 
title  but  that  conferred  by  the  Bull  of  Pope  Alexander  VI.  could 
Mr.  Buchanan  have  conceived  that  Spain  had  asserted  the  ultimaie 
sovereignty  over  the  Western  side  of  North  America  for  nearly  three 
centuries  ?  This  was  the  only  title  possessed  by  Spain,  and  asserted 
in  the  face  of  Europe  for  any  thing  near  three  centuries ;  and  neither 
this  nor  any  other  title  asserted  by  Spain  to  the  western  coast  of 
America  beyond  the  regions  contiguous  to  her  actual  seitlements 
was  "  acquiesced  in  by  all  European  governments,"  as  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan affirms,  but  was  merely  permitted  to  pass  unnoticed,  so 
lonff  as  it  did  not  interfere  with  their  trade  and  settlements.  But  of 
this  more  presently. 

Let  us  pass  to  the  claim  set  up  for  Spain  founded  upon  discovery, 
taking  possession,  settlement,  &c.  Here  let  me  commence  by 
quoting  a  passage  from  Vattel's  Law  of  Nations,  which  may  be  re- 
commended to  the  serious  attention  and  careful  study  of  all  who 
wish  really  to  understand  the  subject  under  consideration — a  passage 
to  which  I  am  astonished  that  so  little  reference  has  been  made  by 
either  side  in  this  controversy.  Vattel,  as  every  body  knows,  is  the 
very  highest  authority  in  such  matters,  and  in  the  present  instance 
his  opinions  are  so  reasonable,  so  accordant  with  common  sense 
and  sound  philosophy,  as  to  claim  universal  assent.  The  passage 
may  be  found  in  Book  I.,  chap.  18,  at  page  99  of  the  fourth  Ameri- 
can edition. 

"  All  mankind  have  an  equal  right  to  things  that  have  not  yet  fallen 
into  the  possession  of  any  one  j  and  those  things  belong  to  the  person 
who  first  takes  possession  of  them.  When,  therefore,  a  nation  finds  a 
country  uninhabited,  and  without  an  owner,  it  may  lawfully  take  posses- 
sion of  it;  and  after  it  has  sufficiently  made  known  its  will  in  this  respect, 
it  cannot  bo  deprived  of  it  by  another  nation.  Thus,  navigators  going 
on  voyages  of  discovery,  furnished  with  a  commission  from  their  sove- 
reign, and  meeting  with  islands  or  other  lands  in  a  desert  state,  have 
taken  possession  of  them  in  the  name  of  their  nation  :  and  this  title  has 


,** 


13 


d  as  a 
}earing 
;  Noot- 
lon  im 
rted  for 
imerica 
i  never 
er  what 
'.  could 
iltimate 
ly  three 
isserted 
neither 
coast  of 
laments 
^r.   Bu- 
iced,  so 
But  of 

□covery, 
jnce  by 

be  re- 
all  who 
passage 
made  by 
ra,  is  the 
instance 
m  sense 
passage 

Ameri- 


et  fallen 
e  person 

finds  a 
e  posses- 

refipect, 
>rs  going 
eir  sove- 
ite,  have 
title  has 


been  usually  respected,  provided  it  was  soon  after  followed  by  a  real 
possession. 

"  But  it  is  questioned  whether  a  nation  can,  by  the  bare  act  of  taking 
possession,  appropriate  to  itself  countries  which  it  does  not  really  occupy, 
and  thus  engross  a  much  greater  extent  of  territory  than  it  is  able  to 
people  or  cultivate.  It  is  not  difficult  to  determin  t  that  such  a  preten- 
sion would  be  an  absolute  infringement  of  the  natural  rights  of  men 
and  repugnant  to  the  views  of  nature,  which,  having  destined  the  whole 
earth  to  supply  the  wants  of  mankind  in  general,  gives  no  mition  a  right 
to  appropriate  to  itself  a  country,  except  for  the  purpose  of  making  use 
of  it,  and  not  of  hindering  others  from  deriving  adcantage  from  it. 
The  law  of  nations,  will,  therefore,  not  acknowledge  the  property  and 
sovereignty  of  a  nation  over  any  uninhabited  countries,  except  those  oj 
which  it  has  really  taken  actual  possession,  in  which  it  has  formed  settle- 
ments,  or  of  which  it  makes  actual  use.  In  effect,  when  navigatorti  have 
met  with  desert  countries  in  which  those  of  other  nations  had,  in 
their  transient  visits,  erected  some  monument  to  show  their  having  taken 
possession  of  them,  they  have  paid  as  little  regard  to  that  empty  ceremony* 
as  to  the  regulation  of  the  popes,  who  divided  a  great  part  of  the  world 
between  the  crowns  of  Castile  and  Portugal." 

The  principles  laid  down  here  are  those  which  have  generally 
guided  the  conduct  of  European  nations  in  regard  of  their  dis- 
coveries on  this  continent. 

The  Spanish  monarchs  laid  claim  to  the  whole  of  the  eastern  as 
well  as  the  western  coast  of  North  America  by  the  right  of  their 
prior  discovery  of  the  New  World,  and  under  the  title  granted  by 
Aiexander  VI.,  a  title  which,  however  absurd  now — too  absurd  for 
Mr.  Buchanan  to  make  the  least  allusion  to  it  in  his  argument — 
appeared  in  a  very  different  light  to  the  nations  of  Christendom  in 
the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century.* 

In  1497,  Henry  VIII.  of  England  commissioned  John  and  Sebas- 
tian Cabot  to  attempt  the  discovery  of  a  north-west  p  ssageto  India. 
The  Cabots  discovered  New  Foundland,  and  afterwards  coasted  this 
continent  from  67°  north  latitude,  down  nearly  to  the  coast  of 
Florida.  The  English  monarchs,  I  believe,  have  on  some  occasions 
asserted  a  claim  to  the  possession  of  the  eastern  side  of  this  conti- 
nent by  right  of  this  discovery.  But  what  respect  has  been  paid  to 
these  claims,  whether  of  Spain  or  of  England,  may  be  judged  from 
the  history  of  the  settlement  of  this  part  of  the  continent.     When 

*  The  Pope'.s  grant,  was  in  fact  eagerly  sought  by  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  who 
sent  an  ambassador  to  Rome  on  this  special  errand.  See  Robertson's  America, 
B.  2nd,  page  C5  of  Harper's  edition. 


14 


the  English  proposed  to  plant  colonies  on  this  coast,  what  respect 
did  they  pay  to  the  prior  discovery  of  Spain,  or  the  title  derived 
from  Alexander  VI.  ?  And,  when  the  French  entertained  the  pro- 
ject of  planting  a  colony  on  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  on  the  Mississippi, 
what  attention  did  they  pay  to  the  claim,  whether  of  the  Spanish  or 
English  monarchs?  Again,  when  the  Dutch  chose  to  plant  u  colony 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Hudson,  did  they  listen  to  the  claims  of  those 
who  had  visited  this  continent  before  them  ?  The  same  inquiry 
may  be  made  in  regard  of  the  Swedes,  who  planted  themselves  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Delaware. 

If  the  claim  of  Spain  to  the  whole  western  coastof  this  continent 
— a  claim  neither  better  nor  worse  than  her  claim  to  the  eastern 
coast — remained  for  a  long  period  unquestioned,  it  was  simply  be- 
cause no  European  power  thought  of  establishing  settlements,  or 
even  of  trading  on  that  coast  till  late  in  the  last  century.  But  that 
European  nations  regarded  in  the  same  light  the  claims  of  Spain  to 
the  western  coast,  as  they  did  those  to  the  eastern  coast  of  North 
America,  is  obvious  from  the  fact  that  in  the  charters  of  several  of 
the  English  colonies  in  this  country,  a  territory  is  granted  extending 
across  the  whole  continent  to  the  South  Sea  or  Pacific  Ocean. 
How,  then,  can  Mr.  Buchanan  consistently,  with  the  facts  of  the 
case,  assert  that  the  title  of  Spain  was  "  acquiesced  in  by  all  Euro- 
pean governments?"  It  was  in  no  other  way  "acquiesced  in" 
than  the  exactly  similar  claim  of  Spain  to  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
continent  was  acquiesced  in  for  more  than  a  century,  till  the  Eng- 
lish, French  and  Dutch  resolved  to  extend  their  trade  and  send 
their  colonies  to  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  Until  near  the  close  of 
the  last  century  there  was  no  practical  utility  in  contesting  the 
Spanish  title  to  the  unsettled  portion  of  the  western  coast.  And 
yet  even  before  any  motive  arose  for  questioning  this  title,  we  find 
that  it  was  treated  as  nugatory  in  the  charters  granted  by  England 
to  her  colonies  in  this  country — treated  with  the  same  disrespect  as 
the  title  to  the  eastern  cc  ast,  granted  by  the  same  Bull  of  Alexander 
VI. 

When  the  English,  at  the  close  of  the  last  century,  began  to  ex- 
tend their  trade  to  the  northwestern  coast  of  this  continent,  they 
treated  the  exclusive  claims  of  Spain  in  that  quarter,  as  equally  chi- 
merical with  those  which  she  had  formerly  asserted  to  the  eastern 
coast.  This  conduct  of  England  was  resisted  by  force  on  the  part 
of  the  Viceroy  of  Mexico,  and  by  argument  on  the  part  of  the 


1 


15 


respect 
ierived 
he  pro- 
issippi, 
nish  or 
colony 
f  those 
inquiry 
;lves  at 

ntinent 
eastern 
iply  be- 
ents,  or 
3ut  that 
Spain  to 
f  North 
iveral  of 
Ltending 

Ocean. 
5  of  the 
11  Euro- 
ced  in" 
t  of  the 

le  Eng- 
nd  send 

close  of 
ting  the 
And 

we  find 
England 

spect  as 

exander 

in  to  ex- 

ent,  they 

lally  chi- 

eastern 

the  part 

t  of  the 


t. 


Spanish  court,  and  ended  in  a  virtual  abandonment  of  the  exclusive 
claims  of  Spain  by  the  treaty  of  the  Escurial. 

The  United  States  too  have  pursued  the  same  course  as  Great 
Britain  in  regard  of  the  Spanish  title.  All  the  claims  set  up  by  Spain 
to  the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  the  western  coast  of  America,  were 
treated  as  chimerical  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  when  he  commissioned  Lewis 
and  Clarke  to  explore  the  countries  watered  by  the  Columbia  ;  that 
is,  if  he  intended  that  this  country  should,  by  the  discovery  and  ex- 
ploration of  the  regions  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  establish  any 
claim  to  the  possession  of  them.  If  not,  there  is  an  inconsistency 
in  our  negotiators  setting  up  any  title  to  the  country  on  the  banks 
of  the  Colu  bia,  in  consequence  of  the  discoveries  and  exploration 
of  Lewis  and  Clarke.  But  passing  this,  it  is  plain  that,  by  the  con- 
vention of  1818  with  the  British  government  in  regard  of  the  Ore- 
gon territory,  this  country  treated  the  exclusive  claims  of  Spain  to 
the  unoccupied  parts  of  the  western  coast  as  chimerical,  as  deserving 
no  respect,  as  unsanctioned  by  t  le  principles  of  public  law,  and  the 
usages  of  civilized  nations.  By  entering  into  that  convention,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  distinctly  recognized  the  principle 
that  the  territory  was  still  open  to  the  occupation  of  others,  notwith- 
standing the  claims  of  sovereignty  asserted  by  Spain.  Of  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan's inconsistency  in  asserting  claims  founded  on  principles  ir- 
reconcilable, and  which  consequently  nullify  each  other,  and  of  the 
damage  which  he  has  in  this  way  done  to  his  cause  with  every  honest 
and  sound  reasonei,  and  of  the  sophistry  by  which  he  attempts  to 
defend  himself,  when  charged  with  this  inconsistency  by  Mr.  Pa- 
kenham,  I  intend  to  take  notice  hereafter.  The  remarks  now  made 
will  suffice  to  show  that  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  the  passage  above 
quoted  from  Vattel  accords  with  the  principles  which  have  general- 
ly governed  the  conduct  of  nations  in  regard  of  the  right  of  prior 
discovery,  and  of  forming  settlements  on  this  continent. 

Let  us  then  pass  in  review  some  of  the  principles  laid  down  in 
this  passage,  and  make  their  application  to  the  subject  in  debate. 

1.  That  a  claim  founded  on  the  right  of  discovery  be  reckoned 
valid,  the  discovery  must  be  made  by  parties  furnished  with  a  com- 
mission for  this  express  purpose  from  the  sovereignty  of  the  country 
which  advances  the  claim.  This  is  a  principle  obviously  conforma- 
ble to  common  sense.  In  all  the  ancient  claims  founded  on  the 
right  of  discovery  by  the  European  nations,  this  principle  seems  to 
have  been  fully  recognized.     To  suppose  that  a  private  adventurer 


16 


»l 


trading  with  a  savage  country  can,  by  the  simple  fact  that  he  has 
been  the  first  of  the  European  race  that  has  touched  upon  a  certain 
coast,  or  entered  a  certain  river,  establish  a  title  to  the  sovereignty 
of  all  the  adjacent  territory  for  the  country  whose  flag  he  carries,  is 
manifestly  absurd. 

2.  The  discoverer,  fortified  by  a  commission  from  his  own  gov- 
ernment, must  have  taken  formal  possession  of  the  unappropriated 
territory,  in  the  name  of  his  sovereign  or  nation.  The  fact  that  pos- 
session has  been  thus  formally  taken  must  also  be  "  sufficiently  made 
known  "  by  the  claimant  to  those  whom  it  may  concern.  This  was 
usually  done  by  the  erection  of  some  monument  surmounted  by  the 
flag  of  the  nation  taking  possession,  and  by  notice  to  the  courts  of 
friendly  powers. 

These  principles  seem  to  have  been  forgotten  or  overlooked  by 
both  parties  in  the  late  negotiation.  And  yet  they  manifestly  anni- 
hilate the  claim  set  up  by  this  government  to  the  possession  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Columbia  in  consequence  of  the  discovery  of  Captain 
Gray.  Mr.  Pakenham,  for  what  reason  I  cannot  see,  whilst  object- 
ing to  the  claim  of  his  opponent  founded  on  the  discovery  of  Gray, 
has  not  given  that  force  to  his  objection  which  he  might  have  done 
by  appealing  to  these  principles,  and  to  the  passage  from  Vattel  on 
which  I  am  commenting;  and  he  has  himself  introduced  among  the 
grounds  of  claim  possessed  by  Great  Britain,  a  case  still  more  objec- 
tionable on  these  principles  than  even  that  of  Gray's  discovery,  I  allude 
to  the  statement  in  Mr.  Pakenham's  letter  of  the  29th  July,  1845,  that 
"  In  1787,  Captain  Berkley,  a  British  subject,  in  a  vessel  under 
Austrian  colors,  discovered  the  straits  of  Fuca."  Mr.  Pakenham 
indeed  founds  nothing  on  this  discovery  of  Captain  Berkley.  Still 
it  is  dangerous  to  a  cause  to  introduce  irrelevant  statements  like 
this.  The  weakness  of  this  statement  has  been  discovered  by  some, 
who  have  not  sufficient  penetration  to  detect  much  more  impor- 
tant irrelevancies,  and  specimens  of  the  most  unsound  reasoning  in 
the  correspondence.  It  tends  to  strengthen  the  claim  founded  on 
Gray's  discovery.  Mr.  Pakenham  is  not  the  only  party  in  the  nego- 
tiation who  has  weakened  and  injured  his  cause  by  bringing  forward 
what  had  better  been  passed  over.  Were  I  to  speak  of  the  corres- 
pondence purely  as  a  logical  exercise,  I  would  pass  the  same  cen- 
sure upon  Mr.  Buchanan's  whole  argument  from  the  Spanish  title. 
With  all  clear-headed  logicians  this  argument  would  certainly  pre- 
judice his  cause.     But  Mr.  Buchanan  well  knew  that  his  appeal 


17 


hat  he  has 
m  a  certain 
sovereignty 
e  carries,  is 

lis  own  gov- 
ippropriated 
act  that  pos- 
jiently  made 
This  was 
inted  by  the 
he  courts  of 

erlooked  by 
lifestly  anni- 
jssion  of  the 
y  of  Captain 
kvhilst  object- 
ery  of  Gray, 
It  have  done 
)m  Vattel  on 
;d  among  the 
I  more  objec- 
very,  I  allude 
ly,  1845,  that 
vessel  under 
r.  Pakenham 
rkley.      Still 
ttements  like 
ered  by  some, 
more  impor- 
reasoning  in 
m  founded  on 
}'  in  the  nego- 
iging  forward 
)f  the  corres- 
the  same  cen- 
Spanish  title, 
certainly  pre- 
at  his  appeal 


was  not  exclusively  to  logicians,  or  to  men  of  calm  and  unbiassed 
minds.  I  have  noticed  Gray's  discovery  of  the  mouth  of  the  Colum- 
bia only  in  passing,  and  by  way  of  illustration,  vvithout  the  design 
of  building  any  argument  upon  it.  My  intention  at  present  is  to 
show  the  exact  worth  of  the  Spanish  title,  on  which  Mr.  Buchanan 
seems  disposed  in  the  correspondence  to  rest  the  whole  weight  of 
his  claim  in  favor  o^  the  United  States  ;  and  on  which  alone,  indeed, 
any  claim  can  be  rested  so  far  as  regards  an  exclusive  title  to  the 
northern  part  of  the  territory  in  dispute. 

3.  It  is  laid  down  in  this  passage  from  Vattel,  that  in  order  to 
render  a  title  aciijired  in  this  way  worthy  to  be  respected  by  other 
nations,  it  must  be  "  soon  after  followed  by  a  real  possession,"  that 
is,  by  actual  settlement.  This  possession,  like  the  discovery,  in  order 
to  afford  foundation  for  an  indisputable  title,  should  be  made  by  the 
authority  of  the  nation  so  claiming  the  title,  not  by  mere  private 
adventurers.  All  the  colonies  planted  by  European  nations  on  this 
continent,  were  established  in  this  way.  It  is  manifestly  unreasona- 
ble that  a  nation  should  claim  a  territory  because  it  has  been  par- 
tially settled  by  the  natives  of  that  country,  merely  in  the  character 
of  private  adventurers.  Especially  will  this  hold  if  we  admit,  what 
this  country  with  great  propriety  mamtains,  that  an  individual,  re- 
moving himself  beyond  the  bounds  of  his  native  government,  may 
withdraw  his  allegiance  and  expatriate  himself.  If  this  view  of  the 
subject  be  correct — and  surely  the  passage  before  us,  and  the  uni- 
versal practice  of  European  nations  in  forming  settlements  on  this 
continent  countenance  it — the  United  States  have  as  yet  established 
no  title  to  any  part  of  the  Oregon  territory  by  a  settlement  regularly 
sanctioned  and  protected  by  the  government.  It  is  true  the  present 
settlers  south  of  the  Columbia  may  transfer  to  their  own  government 
the  claims  which  they  have  established  for  themselves  by  settlement. 
They  have  proposed  to  do  so,  and  this  I  look  upon  as  the  best  and  least 
objectionable  claim  which  the  United  States  can  set  up  to  an  ex- 
clusive possession  of  any  part  of  the  territory  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains. 

This  reasoning  in  regard  of  the  necessity  of  a  settlement  being 
formally/  authorized  and  sanctioned  by  the  government  which  claims 
territory  in  consequence  of  the  formation  of  such  settlement,  you 
may  receive  or  reject,  as  you  please.  To  me  it  appears  sound.  Yet, 
as  I  intend  to  rest  no  material  conclusion  upon  it,  I  leave  this  an 
open  question.  I  only  contend  strenuously  for  the  principle  expressly 


■£ 


18 


1 


stated  by  Vattel,  and  as  stated  by  him,  that  a  title  from  discovery,  in 
order  to  be  respected  by  other  nations,  must  be  "  soon  after  foUowtd 
by  actual  possession,"  and  the  formation  of  settlements. 

4.  A  nation  has  no  right  to  claim  exclusive  title  by  discovery 
and  taking  possession  to  a  territory  immensely  larger  than  it  can 
really  occupy,  *'  and  thus  engross  a  much  greater  extent  of  territory 
than  it  is  able  to  people  or  cultivate." 

The  reasonableness  of  each  of  these  principles  is  so  manifest,  as, 
in  my  opinion,  to  require  no  further  illustration.  By  these  I  pro- 
ceed to  try  the  worth  of  the  Spanish  title  to  the  territory  from  the 
42°  of  North  latitude  between  the  Rocky  Mountains  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  ceded  to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty  of  Florida. 

And  here,  for  the  purpose  of  abbreviating  my  remarks,  I  suppose 
it  granted  that  Spain  had  acquired  all  the  claim  to  the  title  of  the 
territory  up  to  Gl°  of  North  latitude,  which  prior  discovery   in 
national  vessels  could  confer,  and  all  the  claim  which  landing  on 
certain  parts  of  the  coast  and  taking  formal  possession  of  them  in 
the  name  of  his  Catholic  Majesty,  could   add  lo  the  right  of  dis- 
covery.    There  need  be  no  dispute  about  these  facts,  no  more  than 
about  the  title  conferred  by  Alexander  VI.,  which  Spain,  no  doubt, 
considered  for  a  long  time  her  most  valid  title.    If  the  doctrine  here 
laid  down  by  the  great  authority  on  all  such  matters,  and  confirmed, 
as  I  have  shown,  by  a  reference  to  the  conduct  of  the  European 
nations  in  making  settlements  on  this  continent,  be  sound,  Spain 
had  utterly   forfeited  her  title,  whatever  it  might  be,  by  non  user 
She  had  never  made  a  single  permanent  settlement  in  any  part  of 
the  disputed  territory  during  the  three  hundred  years  that  she  had 
claimed  it.     Her  settlements  for  a  great  distance  to  the  South  of 
42°  of  North  latitude  were  exceedingly  sparse,  so  that  she  could 
scarcely  lay  claim  even  to  the  southern  portion  of  the  territory  by 
right  of  contiguity.     The  latter  part  of  the  quotation  from  Vattel 
applies  with  full  force  to  the  claim  of  Spain  to  the  territory  watered 
by  the  Columbia.  "  Such  a  pretension  would  be  an  absolute  infringe- 
ment of  the  natural  rights  of  men,  and  repugnant  to  the  views  of 
nature,  which,  having  destined  the  whole  earth  to  supply  the  wants  of 
mankind  in  general,  gives  no  nation  a  right  to  appropriate  to  itself 
a  country,  except  for  the  purpose  of  making  use  of  it,  and  not  of 
hindering  others  from  deriving  advantage  from  it.     The  law  of  na 
tions  will,  therefore,  not  acknowledge  the  property  and  sovereignty 
of  a  nation  over  any  uninhabited  countries,  except  those  of  which  it 


VL 


.,J0' 


very, lu 
followed 


iscovery 
I  it  can 
erritory 

fest,  as, 
5  I  pro- 
Vom  the 
!  Pacific 

suppose 
e  of  the 
very  in 
ding  on 
them  in 

of  dis- 
)re  than 
L>  doubt, 
ine  here 
ifirmed, 
uropean 
],  Spain 
on  user 

part  of 
she  had 
South  of 
e  could 
itory  by 
1  VatteJ 
watered 
ifringt- 
vicws  of 
cants  of 
to  itself 
i  not  of 
1  of  na 
rtignty 
which  it 


19 

has  really  taken  actual  possession ,  in  tvhich  it  has  formed  si  tthrnents, 
or  of  which  it  makes  actual  use."  This  language  exactly  expresses 
the  view  which  the  British  government  seems  to  have  taken  of  the 
pretensions  of  Spain  in  the  scitlement  of  the  difficulty  at  Nookta 
Sound,  by  the  convention  of  the  Escurial.  Such  obviously  was  the 
view  taken  of  these  same  pretensions  by  the  government  of  this 
country,  when  it  claimed  from  Great  Britain  the  restoration  of  the 
settlement  made  by  Mr.  Astor,  and  when  it  agreed  to  the  convention 
of  1818  ;  and  the  same  seems  to  have  been  the  view  entertained  by 
Mr.  Jefferson,  when  he  commissioned  Lewis  and  Clarke  to  explore 
the  country  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 

In  whom  then  was  the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  the  territory 
vested  ?  It  is,  in  my  opinion,  unnecessary  to  answer  this  question. 
It  might  not  be  easy  to  answer  it,  if  we  admit  as  sound  the  princi- 
ple OR  which  the  Europeans  have  acted  in  reference  to  the  title  of 
the  Aborigines  of  this  country  to  their  native  forests.  Common 
sense  and  natural  law  would  say  that  the  sovereignty  belonged  to 
the  hitherto  undisputed  and  undisturbed  possessors  of  the  country, 
so  far  forth  as  that  possession  extended.  It  might  not  be  right  to 
assert  that  the  occupation  of  a  territory  by  hunters  is  of  the  same 
nature  as  the  occupation  of  it  by  husbandmen,  who  distribute  its 
lands  into  fixed  and  separate  divisions  for  the  purpose  of  tillage  and 
improvement.  Common  sense  will  lead  us  to  conclude  that  title  to 
a  territory  is  much  strengthened  by  the  investment  of  capital  and 
labor  in  improving  it.  But,  waiving  all  further  discussion  of  this 
point  as  irrelevant,  it  is  easy  to  answer  the  above  question  negative- 
ly :  when  the  English  first  commenced  their  settlements  in  the  dis- 
puted territory,  the  sovereignty  of  said  territory  agreeably  to  the 
principles  of  natural  and  national  law  (having  their  foundation  in 
the  sound  common  sense  of  mankind)  belonged  as  yet  to  no  Euro- 
pean power. 

Farther,  I  believe  with  some,  who  have  expressed  their  opinions 
on  this  matter,  that  no  civilized  nation,  as  yet,  has  a  just  claim  to 
the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  any  part  of  the  territory,  save  so  much 
as  has  been  actually  settled  by  civilized  inhabitants,  allowing  such 
settlements  as  have  been  formed  a  reasonable  extent  of  contiguous 
territory.  I  consider  the  portions  of  the  territory  distant  from  the 
English  and  American  settlements  as  open,  to  this  day,  to  be  colo- 
nized by  any  nation,  that  may  think  proper  to  engage  in  such  un- 
dertaking— nothwithstanding  the  brutum  fulmen  of  Mr.   Monroe, 


*:i 


20 

repealed  by  Mr.  Polk.  And  were  France,  or  any  other  nation,  to 
plant  a  colony  at  a  sufficient  distance  from  the  present  settlers,  and 
especially  not  on  any  of  the  waters  passing  the  already  formed  set- 
tlements, the  laws  and  usages  recognized  by  civilized  nations  would, 
in  my  opinion,  afford  no  pretext  for  excluding  them  ;  and  the  expul- 
sion of  such  colony  when  formed  would  be  an  injnry  to  be  resented 
by  the  French  government.  This  seems  to  be  the  opinion  of  dis- 
passionate observers,  judging  from  the  remarks  in  some  of  the 
French  gazettes.  And  it  may  be  observed  that  Great  Britain  in  the 
whole  of  the  late  correspondence  appears  to  have  set  up  no  claim 
inconsistent  with  the  views  of  this  subject  now  stated. 

If  the  foregoing  reasoning  be  sound,  it  follows  that  the  British 
Government  possesses  claims  stronger  and  more  legitimate  io  certain 
portions  of  the  disputed  territory  than  the  United  States  can  justly 
assert  to  anj/  portion  of  it ;  at  least  till  such  time  as  the  settlers  from 
this  country  formally  surrender  to  the  government  the  claim  which 
they  have  acquired  by  occupation.  If,  therefore,  after  giving  notice 
of  the  termination  of  the  convention  of  joint  occupation,  an  attempt 
should  be  made  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States  to  intrude 
on  the  territories  occupied  by  the  British  government  through  the 
Hudson  Bay  Company,  and,  much  more,  if  an  attempt  should  be 
made  to  dispossess  the  British  occupants,  it  would  give  just  cause  for 
resistance  of  the  intruders  or  assailants ;  and  should  war  ensue — as 
it  certainly  would — all  intelligent  and  impartial  men  would  justify 
the  resistance,  and  lay  all  the  blame  to  the  charge  of  the  intruders. 
The  sympathies  of  all  clear-headed  and  sound-hearted  men  would 
be  on  the  side  of  the  party  attacked.  The  intrusion  into  the  regions 
occupied,  or  expulsion  of  the  occupants,  would  bean  undoubted  and 
a  most  flagrant  breach  of  the  laws  of  nations,  as  hitherto  under- 
stood, and  acquiesced  in,  not  only  by  the  European  nations  settling 
countries  on  this  side  the  Atlantic,  but  by  these  United  States,  on 
the  occasions  already  noticed ;  and  the  party  that  would  dare  to 
pursue  such  a  course,  and  thus  engage  two  powerful  nations  in  a 
desperate  conflict,  and  interrupt  the  peace  and  the  commercial  in- 
tercourse of  the  civilized  world,  would  deserve  and  receive  the  ex- 
ecrations of  universal  Christendom. 

It  will  be  readily  perceived  that  the  view  now  given  of  the  value 
of  the  Spanish  title,  sets  aside  altogether  the  quibbling  of  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan regarding  the  terms  of  the  convention  of  the  Escurial,  and 
the  alleged  termination  of  this  convention  by  the  war  which  followed  , 


II 


21 


I  at  ion,  to 
lers,  and 
med  set- 
is  would, 
he  expul- 
resented 
n  of  dis- 
e  of  the 
lin  in  the 
no  claim 

e  British 

0  certain 
an  justly 
lers  from 
im  which 
ng  notice 

1  attempt 

0  intrude 
ough  the 
huuld  be 
cause  for 
nsue — as 
Id  justify 
intruders, 
en  would 
e  regions 
jbted  and 
;o  under- 
s  settling 
States,  on 

1  dare  to 
ions  in  a 
ercial  in- 
ve  the  ex- 

the  value 
'  Mr.  Bu- 
urial,  and 
I  followed 


between  Spain  and  Great  Britain.  This  convention,  and  ihc  events 
which  preceded  it,  are  simply  to  be  considered,  in  reference  to  this 
controversy,  as  an  emphatic  dechiration  on  tlie  part  of  Great  Britain, 
that  she  did  not,  and  would  not  admit  ihn  claim  set  up  by  Spain  to 
the  whole  western  coast  of  North  America,  and  enforced  in  the  case 
of  Meares  by  the  viceroy  of  Mexico.  The  consequence  of  the 
course  then  pursued  by  Great  Britain  was,  that  Spain  never  again 
attempted  to  perform  any  act  of  exclusive  sovereignty  on  the  part  of 
the  coast,  now  claimed  by  Great  Britain.  She  gave  up  the  contest 
forever;  and  the  principle  settled  by  this  affair  was  one  which  a 
mere  declaration  of  war  could  never  unsettle.  Nothing  after  this  short 
of  the  expulsion  of  the  English  traders  and  settlers  by  force  of  arms  in 
war,  or  a  cession  in  peace  by  treaty,  followed  up  in  both  cases  by  a 
real  possession  and* settlement,  could  re-establish  the  claim  relin- 
quished by  Spaiti,  and  now  imprudently  and  unreasonably,  if  not 
unjustly,  re  asserted  by  the  President  and  Mr.  Buchanan.  Should 
Mr.  Buclianan  expect  that  after  her  subjects  have  formed  settlements 
of  some  value  in  that  region,  Great  Britain  will,  in  1846,  treat  this 
claim  in  any  other  way  than  she  did  in  1789,  when  the  British  trade 
with  that  part  of  the  world,  and  the  capital  invested  there,  were  iu 
themselves  deserving  of  no  consideration  ?* 

*  It  appears  to  me  that  it  is  questionable  whether  such  a  claim  as  Spain  pre- 
tended to  possess,  even  admitting  her  own  pretensions — a  claim  founded  barely  on 
discovery — admits  of  ttansfcM'.  There  are,  as  every  body  knows,  things  of  such 
a  nature,  that  though  we  have  a  right  to  use  them  ourselves,  we  have  not  the 
right  of  transferring  them  to  others.  Query — Are  not  rights  obtained  by  discovery 
of  this  description  ?  Has  a  transfer  of  any  such  title  to  another  nation,  as  that 
to  the  western  coast  above  42^  of  north  latitude,  which  Spain  is  alleged  to  have 
transferred  to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty  of  Florida,  ever  before  happened  in 
the  civilized  world  ?  If  so,  the  principle  may  be  established  by  precedent.  It  may 
be  so  for  aught  I  know  to  the  contrary.  But  if  not,  and  if  this  is  a  solitary  instance, 
I  should  consider  arguments  drawn  from  analogy  as  very  strongly  bearing 
against  the  lawfulness  of  such  transfer.  1  refer,  of  course,  to  the  principles  of 
natural  law. 

I  state  this  point  only  as  a  query.  My  argument  needs  no  help  from  it.  But 
I  cannot  neglect  the  opportunity  of  remarking  that  this  whole  transaction  with 
Spain  in  regard  to  her  claim  on  the  western  coast  of  North  America,  has  always 
appeared  to  me  little  honorable  either  to  Spain  or  the  United  States.  It  was 
rather  a  mean  attempt  on  the  part  of  Spain  to  obtain  a  something,  if  it  were  only 
good  will,  for  that  which  she  was  conscious  could  never  avail  her  any  thing,  if  left 
to  use  it  hereelf.  The  i'lct  that  she  could  make  no  use  of  her  claim  ought  to  have 
been  a  reason  for  leaving  the  territory, so  fiir  as  lay  in  her  power,  open  to  the  whole 
world.    On  the  part  of  this  country,  it  was  rather  a  small  affair — too  like  the  act 


f? 


•If: 


ii 


22 

What  has  boen  said  is  sufficient,  as  1  think,  to  show  that  the 
foundation  on  which  Mr.  Bucliannn  has  built  his  argument  in  his  let- 
ter to  Mr.  Pakenham  of  August  30,  I84r»,  has  no  solidity  whatever. 
His  reasoning  in  regard  of  the  validity  of  the  Spanish  title  is  unsup- 
ported by  a  single  principle  of  public  law,  or  by  any  respectable  pre- 
cedent established  by  the  intcrcouse  of  nations.  Having  subverted 
the  foundation,  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine  his  reasoning  in  detail. 
So  far  as  the  assertion  of  a  claim  beyond  the  valley  of  the  Columbia 
is  concerned,  if  the  Spanish  title  to  the  whole  territory  is  untenable 
— utterly  unfounded,  as  I  think  it  must  appear  to  every  unprejudiced 
inquirer,  after  examining  the  principles  which  I  have  stated  above 
— Mr.  Buchanan's  boasted  argument  falls  utterly  to  the  ground,  and 
merits  no  further  attention. 

Yet  there  is  one  piece  of  unsound  reasonin^n  his  answer  to  one 
of  Mr,  Pakenham's  arguments,  which,  as  it  has  made  some  impres- 
sion on  the  public  mind,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  notice  briefly  ;  es- 
pecially as  a  refutation  of  it  will  tend  to  strengthen  the  position 
maintained  in  the  preceding  pages.  I  quote  the  essential  part  of  the 
passage  referred  to  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  words,  that  you  may  see  that 
in  my  comment  I  do  full  justice  to  this  adroit  piece  of  sophistry. 

"  But  the  British  plenipotentiary  argues,  that  '  the  United  States 
can  found  no  claim  on  discovery,  exploration,  and  settlement  effect- 
ed previous  to  the  Florida  treaty,  without  admitting  the  principles 
of  the  Nootka  convention  ;'  *  nor  can  they  appeal  to  any  exclusive 
right  as  acquired  by  the  Florida  treaty,  without  upsetting  all  claims 
adduced  in  their  own  proper  right,  by  reason  of  discovery,  explora- 
tion, and  settlement  antecedent  to  that  arrangement.' 

" This  is  a  most  ingenious  method,"  says  Mr.  Buchanan,  "of 
making  two  distinct  and  independent  titles  held  by  the  same  nation 
worse  than  one — of  arraying  them  against  each  other,  and  thus  de- 
stroying the  validity  of  both.  Does  he  forget  that  the  United  States 
own  both  these  titles.and  can  wield  them  either  separately  or  conjointly 
against  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  at  their  pleasure?  From  the 
course  of  his  remarks  it  might  be  supposed  that  Great  Britain,  and 

of  a  needy  briefless  lawyer — to  buy  up  a  ?'ubiou9  title  for  the  purpose  of  lending  her 
strength  and  abilities  to  support  it.  It  looked  like  seeking  materials  for  a  future 
qunrrel,  or  buying  up  another  man's  quarrel,  through  n  litigious  spirit.  God  grant 
that  through  our  folly  and  madness  in  the  manner  in  which  we  follow  up  this  title, 
wc  may  not  in  the  end  show  that  it  was  really  a  quarrel — a  quarrel  fatal  both  to 
ourselves  and  our  opponents,  which  we  have  unwisely  purchased. 


1 


» 


^> 


23 


t  that  the 
in  his  Ict- 
whatcver. 
is  unsup- 
tabic  prc- 
subverted 
in  detail. 
Culumbia 
untenable 
ircjudiced 
ed  above 
3und, and 

iver  to  one 
le  impres- 
ricfly ;  es- 
e  position 
^art  of  the 
y  sec  that 
histry. 
ited  States 
em  effect- 
principles 
exclusive 
all  claims 
jr,  explora- 

man,  "  of 
ime  nation 

d  thus  de- 
ited  States 
■  conjointly 

From  the 
ritain,  and 

f  lenJingher 

for  a  future 

God  grant 

up  this  title, 

fatal  both  to 


not  the  United  States,  had  acquired  the  Spanish  title  under  the  Flor- 
ida treaty.  But  Great  Britain  is  a  third  party — an  entire  stranger  to 
both  these  titles — and  has  no  right  whatever  to  marshal  the  one 
against  the  other.* 

"  By  what  authority  can  Great  Britain  interpose  in  this  manner? 
Was  it  ever  iiungincd  in  any  court  of  justice  that  the  acquisition  of 
a  new  title  destroyed  the  old  one?  and  vice  vrrsn,  that  the  purchase 
of  the  old  title  destroyed  the  new  one  ?  In  a  question  of  mere  pri- 
vate right,  it  would  bo  considered  absurd,  if  a  stranger  to  both  titles 
should  say  to  the  party  who  had  made  a  settlement,  You  shall  not 
avail  yourself  of  your  possession,  because  this  was  taken  in  violation 
of  another  outstanding  title;  and  although  I  must  admit  that  you 
have  also  acquired  this  outstanding  title,  yet  even  this  shall  avail  you 
nothing,  because,  having  taken  possession  previous  to  your  purchase, 
you  thereby  evinced  that  you  did  not  regard  such  title  as  valid.  And 
yet  such  is  the  mode  by  which  the  British  plenipotentiary  has  at- 
tempted to  destroy  both  the  American  and  Spanish  titles.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  case  mentioned,  the  possession  and  the  outstanding 
title  being  united  in  the  same  individual,  these  conjoined  would  be 
as  perfect  as  if  both  had  been  vested  in  him  from  the  beginning." 

In  the  first  sentence  of  his  reply  to  the  passage  extracted  from 
Mr.  Pakenham's  letter,  Mr.  Buchanan  represents  most  incorrectly 
and  unfairly  the  purpose  of  his  opponent.  That  purpose  was  not  to 
make  *'  two  distinct  and  independent  titles  held  by  the  same  nation 
worse  than  one;"  and  to  "  array  them  against  each  other,  and  thus 
destroy  the  validity  of  both  !"  On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Pakenham's 
avowed  and  sole  purpose  is  to  compel  his  antagonist  to  relinquish  the 
claim  under  the  Spanish  title,  by  showing,  (as  he  has,  in  my  opinion, 
done  satisfactorily,)  that  this  claim,  as  now  brought  forward  and 
urged  by  the  American  government,  is  fatal  to  the  claim  to  the  region 
on  the  banks  of  the  Columbia  made  in  1818,  and  still  maintained 
by  the  American  plenipotentiary.     He  shows  also,  that  by  asserting 

*  Is  this  argument,  or  more  declamntion  ?  Has  Mr.  Buciianan  forgotten 
that  he  was  not  addressing  a  jury  in  a  county  court  ?  Let  me  note  another 
specimen  of  (similar  verbiage  passed  off  as  argument  in  the  same  letter  :  "  Be- 
sides, beyond  all  doubt,  this  discovery  was  made  by  Gray  ;  and  to  wliat  na- 
tion could  the  benefit  of  it  belong,  unless  it  be  to  tlic  United  States?  Cer- 
tainly, not  to  Ureat  Britain.  Jind  if  to  Spain,  the  United  Slates  are  now  her 
representative."  This  is  mere  twaddle  affecting  to  be  reasoning.  How  un- 
like his  predecessor  in  office,  and  in  the  negotiation  !  Quantum  mutatus  ab 
illo! 


I 


24 

a  claim  to  any  portion  of  the  Oregon  territory  in  1618,  the  Ameri- 
can government  recognized  the  soundness  ofthe  principles  on  which 
the  British  government  acted  in  the  affair  of  Nootka  Sound,  in  re- 
pelling the  claii  set  up  by  Spain  to  the  exclusive  sovereignty  ofthe 
whole  coast  of  North  America  for  upwards  of  twenty  degrees  of  lati- 
tude beyond  her  actual  settlements.  Mr.  Pakenham  might  well 
plead,  that  if  such  is  the  validity  of  the  Spanish  title,  that  through 
it  the  United  Slates  have  a  right  at  present — as  asserted  by  Mr. 
Polk  and  Mr.  Buchanan — to  assume  the  sovereignty  of  the  whole 
territory  up  to  the  Russian  settlements,  and  to  expel  the  English 
settlers  after  so  long  occupation,  surely  it  must  have  been  an  act  of 
great  audacity  in  the  United  States  government  in  1818  to  assert 
any  claim  whatever  to  any  part  of  the  Oregon  territory,  and  still 
more  so  to  make  a  proposal  to  the  British  government  for  a  partition 
of  that  territory.  If  Mr.  Buchanan's  broad  assertion  of  the  acknow- 
ledged sovereignty  of  Spain  over  the  whole  Northwest  coast  for 
three  centuries  be  worth  any  thing,  such  partition  would  have  been 
an  act  of  daring  robbery  on  the  part  of  both  nations — certainly  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States,  and  only  less  certainly  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain,  because  she  might  plead  the  privileges  secured  to  her 
under  the  convention  of  the  Escurial,  after  the  affair  of  Nootka 
Sound. 

Mr.  Pakenham  might  justly  have  maintained  that  he  who  defends 
cause  by  argumenia  founded  on  contradictory  principles,  does  it  seri- 
ous injury  with  all  sound  logicians  and  honest  men.  But  yet  Mr.  Pa- 
kenham has  made  no  attempt  to  destroy  the  validity  of  the  claim  of 
the  United  States  previous  to  1818,  by  arraying  against  it  the  Span- 
ish claim.  He  has  shown,  to  be  sure,  that  to  maintain  this  latter 
claim,  is  to  invalidate  the  former  claim.  But,  on  all  occasions,  the 
British  government  appears  to  have  been  generous  in  her  conces- 
sion of  the  claims  of  the  United  States  founded  on  the  discovery  of 
Lewis  and  Clarke,  &-C.,  and  to  have  admitted  greater  validity  in  these 
claims  than,  as  I  think,  they  really  possess  ;  perhaps,  through  a  con- 
sciousness that  her  own  claims  labored  under  the  same  defects  as 
those  of  the  United  States — the  want  of  settlement  and  occupation 
sufficiently  extended  to  secure  a  just  title  as  against  other  civilized 
nations.  Mr.  Pakenham  introduced  the  leasoning  which  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan has  in  this  passage  assailed  with  much  subtlety,  but  with  lit- 
tle fairness  or  sound  logic,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  the  claims 
of  the  British  government  under  the  Nootka  Sound  convention,  and 


25 


he  Ameri- 
son  which 
nd,  in  re- 
rnty  of the 
pes  of  Jati- 
light  well 
it  through 
}d  by  Mr. 
the  whole 
e  English 

an  act  of 
3  to  assert 
,  and  still 
i  partition 
2  acknow- 

coast  for 
liave  been 
Plainly  on 
le  part  of 
red  to  her 
f  Nootka 

o  defends 
es  it  seri- 
;t  Mr.  Pa- 
claim  of 
he  Span- 
his  latter 
jions,  the 
r  conces- 
covery  of 
y  in  these 
tIi  a  con- 
efects  as 
:.cupation 
civilized 
Mr.  Bu- 
t  withlit- 
le  claims 
lion,  and 


his  argument,  consid "ed  as  a  whole,  is  calculated  to  give  validity  to 
the  claims  of  tiie  United  States  previous  to  1819,  and  not  to  destroy 
their  validity.  Mr.  Pakenham  sums  up  'the  part  of  his  argument 
against  which  Mr.  Buchanan's  sophistry,  above  noticed,  is  di- 
rected, in  the  following  manner  :  "  The  undersigned  trusts  that 
he  has  now  shown  that  the  convention  of  1790  (the  Nootka  Sound 
convention)  has  continued  in  full  and  complete  force  up  to  the  pre- 
sent moment — 

"  By  reason,  in  the  first  place,  of  the  commercial  chnracter  of 
some  of  its  provisions,  &,c. 

"  By  reason,  in  the  next  place,  of  the  acquiescence  of  Spain,  &-c. 

"  And,  thirdly,  by  reason  Oi  repeated  acts  of  the  government  of 
\he  United  States,  previous  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Florida  treaty, 
manifesting  adherence  to  the  principles  of  the  Nootka  convention, 
or  at  least  dissent  from  the  exclusive  pretensions  of  Spain." 

Here  we  have  the  purpose,  for  which  Mr.  Pakenham  himself,  in 
the  next  paragraph  to  that  quoted  by  Mr.  Buchanan,  asserts  that  he 
introduced  this  appeal  to  consistency,  this  declaration  of  the  neces- 
sity of  keeping  to  the  same  principles,  the  same  views  of  the  laws 
which  nations  have  adopted  and  followed  in  the  settlement  of  their 
claims  to  territories  on  this  continent — a  very  different  purpose  from 
that  which  Mr.  Buchanan  has  unfairly  substituted  in  its  place,  and 
made  the  occasion  for  a  burst  of  wordy  and  windy  declamation. 

Mr.  Buchanan  talks  as  if  the  two  titles  were  independent  and 
strengthened  one  another — the  one  making  up  for  any  defect  in  the 
other,  as  two  separate  titles  to  a  piece  of  property  claimed  under  the 
municipal  laws  of  a  particular  country.  I  have  no  doubt  that  this  art- 
ful representation  of  the  matter  has  imposed  on  many  a  reader  of  the 
correspondence.  But  Mr.  Buchanan  ought  to  have  remembered, 
that,  if  the  Spanish  title  was  such  as  he  represents  it,  the  title  as- 
serted in  1818  was  not  an  imperfect  title,  but  no  title  at  all.  It  is,  in 
this  case,  a  mere  nullity — a  mere  pretence  set  up  to  cover  i  cowardly 
usurpation  of  the  property  of  another  party,  for  the  present  unable 
to  assert  his  rights,  and  cannot  with  consistency  be  pleaded  in  con- 
nexion with  the  claim  founded  on  the  Spanish  title  as  stated,  and  to 
the  extent  stated,  by  Mr.  Buchanan.  Mr.  Buchanan  draws  an  illus- 
tration from  tlie  courts  of  law — an  ingenious  device,  and  one  which 
has  proved,  it  is  to  be  feared,  but  too  effective  with  many  of  his 
readers.  By  this  device  he  covers  up  the  sophistry  of  his  argument. 
But  the  question  between  him  and  Mr.  Pakenham  is  not  about  titles 


«^--»?«nJR*rttJH(-,:2,jj(s,-« 


t     i 


m 


26 

recognized  as  perfect  or  imperfect  by  the  code  of  some  particular 
nation,  but  about  the  principles  on  which  a  title  can  be  justly 
founded  to  a  national  possession.  It  is  not,  in  other  words,  a  claim 
to  be  settled  by  municipal  law,  which  is  at  issue  between  the  pleni- 
potentiaries, but  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations.  Mr.  Buchanan 
not  only  misstates  the  purpose  of  his  opponent's  arguments,  as  I  have 
already  shown,  but  he  changes  the  issue.  Consequently  his  reason- 
ing is  utterly  irrelevant — a  mere  tissue  of  artful  sophistry  designed 
to  cover  the  rash  assertion  of  Mr.  Polk  in  the  inaugural. 

Mr.  Pakenham  assumes  that,  in  negotiations  between  states,  the 
principles  on  which  claims  are  founded  by  either  party  must  be  con- 
sistent. He  proves  that  the  principles,  on  which  the  claim  to  the 
valley  of  the  Columbia  in  1818  are  founded,  are  wholly  inconsistent 
with  the  principles,  on  which  the  claim  to  the  whole  of  Oregon 
under  the  Spanish  title  are  founded ;  and  thus  brings  the  action  of 
the  United  States  government,  and  the  arguments  and  claims  of  her 
negotiators  to  prove  the  absurdity  and  the  inconsistency  of  the 
claims  set  up  under  the  Spanish  title.  Mr.  Buchanan  wholly  evades 
the  question,  and  escapes  adroitly  from  defending  the  gross  incon- 
sistency of  the  principles  assumed  in  the  course  of  his  correspond- 
ence, in  a  mist  of  words,  and  by  a  reference  to  courts  of  law; 
showing,  in  the  mean  time,  that  he  is  much  better  acquainted  with 
the  species  of  logic  which  prevails  there — the  logic  of  the  advocate 
— than  with  that  higher  and  more  straight-forward  species  of  logic, 
which  becomes  the  statesman.  But  his  escape  to  the  courts  cannot 
avail  him,  for  even  there  a  title  proved  wholly  invalid,  by  the  asser- 
tion of  another  title,  could  not  surely  strengthen  the  latter  title  ; 
though  two  imperfect,  but  not  contradictory ,  titles  might  in  some 
cases  lend  assistance  to  each  other, 

Mr.  Buchanan  adds  to  the  passage  above  quoted,  "The  under- 
signed, while  strongly  asserting  both  these  titles,  and  believing  each  of 
them  separately  to  be  good  as  against  Great  Britain,  has  studiously 
avoided  instituting  any  comparison  between  them."  I  have  no  doubt 
that  Mr.  Buchanan  has  studiously  avoided  any  comparison  between 
the  principles  on  which  these  two  titles  are  founde  It  only  needed 
to  bring  these  principles  together  to  show  their  glaring  inconsistency ; 
and  at  the  same  time  the  unfairness  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  and  Mr. 
Polk's  whole  course  in  managing  this  negotiation.  These  princi- 
ples are  the  clashing  principles  maintained  by  Great  Britain,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Spain,  on  the  other,  in  the  Nootka  Sound  controversy 


tii 


*L..^?; 


I^UM  wm«!1«W|ilWWJ»'lf  y*» 


27 


e  particular 
n  be  justly 
rds,  a  claim 
n  the  pleni- 

Buchannn 
ts,  as  I  have 

his  reason- 
ry  designed 

1  states,  the 
Just  be  con- 
laim  to  the 
'nconsistent 
of  Oregon 
le  action  of 
aims  of  her 
ncy  of  the 
lolly  evades 
ross  incon- 
Jorrespond- 
"ts  of  law; 
linted  with 
le  advocate 
's  of  logic, 
irts  cannot 
'  the  asser- 
itter  title; 
It  in  some 

^he  under- 
ing  each  of 
studiously 
e  no  doubt 
n  between 
ily  needed 
nsistency ; 
i  and  Mr. 
!se  princi- 
in,  on  the 
jntroversy 


— principles  so  opposed,  that  an  appeal  was  about  to  be  made  to 
arms  to  settle  the  contest.  The  one  principle  is  that  by  which,  as 
I  have  shown  above,  Spain  se,  up  a  claim  to  the  whole  of  the  New 
World — both  the  eastern  and  the  v  astern  coasts  of  North  America 
— under  the  sanction  of  the  Pope,  and  through  the  title  founded  on 
the  discovery  of  this  continent  by  Columbus,  while  engaged  in  the 
service  of  the  sovereigns  of  Castile  and  Aragon  ;  and  the  other 
the  principle  fully  and  explicitly  stated  in  the  passage  which  I  have 
quoted  from  Vattel,  and  on  which  all  the  other  nations  of  Europe, 
except  Spain  and  Portugal,  have  constantly  acted  in  forming  settle- 
ments on  this  continent,  and  to  which  the  United  States  has  also 
given  its  most  unequivocal  sanction,  at  least  in  the  case  of  the  claim 
to  the  valley  of  the  Oregon  prior  to  the  year  1819. 

Had  not  the  other  nations  of  Europe  acted  on  this  principle,  and 
resisted  the  exclusive  claims  of  Spain,  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  could 
never  have  obtained  a  footing  on  these  shores  ;  the  foundations  of 
this  great  republic — the  leading  power  of  this  continent — could 
never  have  been  laid.  It  remained  for  Mr.  Polk  and  Mr.  Buchanan 
to  resuscitate  these  exploded  principles  of  decrepit  Spain,  which  if 
they  had  prevailed,  the  territory  occupied  by  the  United  States  would 
have  remained  to  this  day  a  savage  wilderness. 

Yours,  &,c. 


LETTER  III. 

Nein-York,  February,  1846. 
Deau  Sir  : 

If  the  argument  in  the  preceding  letter  be  sound,  we  may  readi- 
ly form  a  correct  judgtuent  of  the  subject  in  controversy  between 
the  two  countries,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  it  ought  to  be  settled. 
Neither,  as  yef,  iias  just  pretensions  to  crclurivr  sovcrdgnty  over  any 
very  considerable  portion  of  the  Oregon  territory.  I  mean  in  case 
notice  of  the  abrogation  of  the  convention  of  1818  were  given. — 
Till  this  notice  is  given,  and  for  a  year  after,  the  terms  of  the  con- 
vention inhibit  any  attempt  to  exercise  exclusive  sovereignty. 

But  were  the  notice  given  and  the  year  elapsed,  neither  nation 
would  have  a  right  to  exclusive  sovereigray,  or  exclusive  possession 


»MBW«*»n-ii«»„ 


28 


fii 


I    Ml 
■      !i  i 


t-l| 


of  any  part  of  the  territory,  save  what  is  occupied  by  their  settle- 
ments and  a  reasonable  portion  of  the  region  contiguous.  All  the 
rest  is  still  open  to  the  world  ;  though  not  likely  to  be  ever  settled  by 
any  other  than  British  subjects  and  American  citizens.  No  other 
power,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  will  feel  a  desire  to  intrude  and  plant 
colonies  under  its  own  protection.  The  whole  territory  seems  des- 
tined to  form  one  great  nation  of  Anglo-Saxon  origin,  which  will, 
in  all  probability  follow  most  closely  the  institutions  of  that  one  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  nations,  which  shall  supply  the  larger  portion  of  its 
population.  I  agree  with  those  who  expect  that  it  will  hereafter 
form  an  independent  republic,  with  institutions  less  or  more  demo- 
cratic. Even  should  the  British  portion  of  the  original  settlers  have 
the  preponderance — and  this  is  not  likely — this  fact  would  not,  in 
my  opinion,  render  the  result  which  I  have  mentioned  less  probable. 
Great  Britain  is  very  far  from  being  a  bad  nurse  of  republicans,  or 
democrats,  if  you  please.  Is  not  the  class  of  our  population,  which 
comes  from  the  British  Isles — I  mean  those  who  come  with  the 
design  of  permanent  settlement — as  orthodox  in  their  democracy  as 
any  other  portion  of  our  citizens?  Were  not  the  fathers  of  this  re- 
public, the  founders  of  its  constitution  and  liberties,  nursed  under 
British  institutions?  And  were  they  not  as  sound  and  consistent 
republicans  as  the  men  of  the  present  generation? 

Those,  who  contemplate  the  Oregon  territory  as  the  future  seal 
of  a  large  number  of  states  united  with  our  confederacy,  indulge  as 
I  think  in  visionary  dreams.  Railroads  to  the  Pacific!  Ports  on 
the  Pacific  !  These  might  be  of  great  advantage  to  the  settlers  in 
that  country,  especially  if  we  pay  the  cost.  But  how  could  they 
serve  us?  What  could  be  raised  by  agricultural  settlers  in  that  re- 
gion which  could  pay  the  expense  of  transportation  hither  by  rail- 
road? Would  it  serve  any  purpose  to  transport  lumber  over  the 
Rocky  Mountains  ?  Or  heavy  produce  of  any  kind?  Furs  will 
soon  be  out  of  the  question.  And  to  bring  the  agricultural  produc- 
tions of  such  a  climate  to  the  Western  States,  would  be  to  carry 
coals  to  Newcastle.  But  the  Chinese  trade  might  be  directed  that 
way.  Very  likely.  Ships  will  cross  the  Pacific  from  China,  from 
India,  and  land  their  cargoes  within  the  Straits  of  Fuca  or  at  the 
port  of  San  Francisco,  after  we  have  annexed  New  California,  and 
then  these  cargoes  will  be  transported  three  thousand  miles  by  rail- 
road to  St.  Louis.  How  much  less  would  it  cost  to  transport  them 
from  St.  Louis,  say  by  the  way  of  Pittsburgh,  to  New-York,  than  to 
transport  them  from  China  direct  by  sea  ? 


M 


eir  seitle- 

All  the 
settled  by 
No  other 
and  plant 
eems  des- 
'hich  will, 
hat  one  of 
rtion  of  its 

hereafter 
lore  demo- 
ttlers  have 
uld  not,  in 
3  probable, 
blicans,  or 
ion,  which 
e  with  the 
Tiocracy  as 
J  of  this  re- 
irsed  under 

consistent 

future  seat 

indulge  as 
!     Ports  on 

settlers  in 
could  they 
3  in  that  re- 
ler  by  rail- 
er  over  the 

Furs  will 
iral  produc- 
je  to  carry 
irected  that 

hina,  from 
ca  or  at  the 

ifornia,  and 
liles  by  rail- 
nsport  them 
ork,  than  to 


29 

But  granted  that  commercial  intercourse  with  Oregon  may  some 
time  become  profitable  to  this  country,  it  may  be  as  advantageously 
carried  on  should  Oregon  become  an  independent  nation,  as  if  it 
were  received  into  the  bonds  of  our  confederacy. 

It  is  useless,  I  presume,  to  advert  to  the  danger  incurred  by  ex- 
tending a  government  like  ours  over  too  large  a  territory.  We  are 
threatened  already  with  the  evils  which  arise  from  embracing  re- 
gions having  interests  opposed,  or,  at  least,  conceived  to  be  opposed, 
under  the  same  general  government.  Prudent  men  apprehend 
serious  danger  from  the  unlimited  extension  of  our  boundaries; 
but  priidence  seems  not  to  be  the  order  of  the  day.  It  is  an  old 
fashioned  and  exploded  virtue,  and  the  worshippers  of  the  great 
goddess  "  Nonsense,  "  of  whom  "  all  of  us  and  all  we  boast  of  is 
the  offspring,"  are  in  the  ascendant. 

I  cannot  dwell  upon  the  matters  above  suggested,  nor  urge  at 
length  the  argument  which  might  be  drawn  from  them.  A  little 
sober  reflection  on  them  would,  I  think,  have  a  tendency  to  mode- 
rate the  ardor  of  some  of  the  most  sensible  of  that  portion  of  our 
citizens  which  seems  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  plunging  the  coun- 
try into  all  the  horrors  of  war  for  the  possession  of  a  territory, 
which  a  very  few  years  may  show  is  never  to  be  of  any  value  to  us, 
at  least  in  the  shape  of  an  integral  part  of  our  republic. 

But  to  return  to  the  subject  with  which  I  commenced  this  letter, 
since  no  civilized  nation  as  yet  has  acquired    an  exclusive  title  to 
Oregon,  and  since  it  is  likely  to  be  of  so  very  little  direct  value 
either  to  the  United  States  or  England,  what  is  the  real  question  re- 
garding it  which  ought  to  be  settled  between  these  nations?     Not 
certainly  the  question  of  the  absolute  or  exclusive  sovereignty  of 
the  territory.     Even  had  they  divided  the  territory  between  them  in 
any  way,  this  would  not  confer  on  each  an  exclusive  title  to  their 
own  share  in  the  partition,  till  they  had  secured  possession  by  actual 
settlement.     The  question  to  be  adjusted  is  simply  this :   Within 
what  limits  will  the  parties  agree  that  their  respective  claims  and 
settlements  in  the  territory  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  shall  be 
henceforward  confined  ?     Settlers  from  this  country  are  beginning  to 
find  their  way  in  great  numbers  over  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and  are 
likely,  ere  long,  to  come  into  collision  with  the  servants  of  the  Hud- 
son  Bay  Company  and  other  British  settlers.     It  is  important  to 
both  countries  that  these  collisions  should  be  prevented.     For  this 
purpose  it  is  requisite  that  a  boundary  be  determined,  to  their  own 


30 

side  of  which  each  party  to  the  compact  shall  be  bound  to  confine 
their  settlements  to  prevent  all  confliciing  jurisdiction.  Each  nation 
can  then,  without  danger  of  collision,  extend  its  protection,  and 
suchof  its  laws  and  institutions,  as  it  may  deem  expedient,  to  the 
occupants  of  that  portion  of  the  territory  lying  on  its  own  side  of 
the  boundary. 

With  the  views  presented  in  tlie  preceding  letter  in  regard  of  the 
claims  of  both  countries  to  Oregon,  and  with  common  sense  views 
of  its  probable  importance  as  an  acquisition  to  either  country,  it 
need  not  be  an  arduous  task  to  settle  this  question.  Somedifliculty 
in  making  a  satisfactory  arrangement  might  arise,  on  the  one  hand, 
from  the  nature  of  the  coast  south  of  the  Columbia,  which  is  repre- 
sented as  utterly  destitute  of  harbors;  and  some  difficulty  on  the 
other  hand,  from  the  fact  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  British  set- 
tlements are  planted  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Columbia  river.  It  is 
within  that  portion  of  the  territory  lying  between  the  Columbia  and 
49^  of  North  latitude  that  Great  Britain  has  acquired  the  most  just 
claim  to  sovereignty  by  actual  settlement.  On  the  other  hand  it 
is  certainly  a  grievance  to  the  settlers  from  this  country  that  they 
should  have  the  command  of  no  good  harbor.  These  difficulties 
might  surely  be  adjusted  between  ihe  parties,  if  both  were  inclined 
to  be  accommodating.  To  provoke  each  other  to  war  for  such  a 
matter,  would  be  only  less  absurd  than  it  would  be  wicked.  If  it 
cannot  be  adjusted  on  generous  and  conciliatory  terms,  it  is  a  case, 
if  ever  there  was  one,  which  oug^  t  to  be  referred  to  arbitration.  It 
was  most  unfortunate  that  Mr.  Calhoun  did  not  accept  of  the  first 
offer  of  arbitration. 

But  it  is  vain  now  to  talk  of  arbitration  during  the  presidency  of 
Mr.  Polk.  Since  the  correspondence  beiween  Mr.  Pakenham  and 
Mr.  Buchanan,  recently  communicated  to  Congress  by  the  President, 
this  is  a  resource  for  the  eventual  settlement  of  the  controversy,  on 
which  we  can  no  longer  calculate.  And  were  I  to  judge  of  the  state 
of  the  question  from  all  the  authentic  and  official  information  wliich 
we  possess  at  present,  I  should  greatly  dread  the  results.  Rumors 
we  have  in  great  abundance  that  some  measure  for  adjusting  the 
question  is  about  to  be  proposed  and  accepted  ;  or,  as  some  say,  to 
.je  referred  to  Congress  to  relieve  the  President  of  all  responsibility 
— a  measure  connected  with  the  abrogation  of  the  British  corn  laws, 
and  the  reduction  of  the  American  tariff,  &,c.  I  am  not  unfriendly 
to  the  policy  of  the  President  in  reference  to  the  latter  subject,  nor 


I, 


31 


J  to  confine 
Each  nation 
ection,  and 
lient,  to  the 
►wii  side  of 

32ard  of  the 
sense  views 
•  country,  it 
nedifijculty 
B  one  hand, 
ch  is  repre- 
uhy  on  the 

British  set- 
river.  It  is 
)lumbia  and 
le  most  just 
tier  hand  it 
y  that  they 

diflicultics 
jre  inclined 

for  such  a 
?ked.  If  it 
it  is  a  case, 
tration.  It 
of  the  first 

•esidency  of 
enham  and 
3  President, 
roversy,  on 
of  the  state 
ation  wliich 
Rumors 
justing  the 
jme  say,  to 
ponsibility 
1  corn  laws, 
,  unfriendly 
iubject,  nor 


to  the  policy  of  Mr.  Peel  in  regard  to  the  former ;  though  I  do  not 
expect  that  the  adoption  of  eitlier  policy  will  effect  all  the  wonders 
which  some  expect  from  them.  I  believe  that  the  repeal  of  the 
corn  laws  at  lea.st  will  be  of  little  advantage  to  us,  and  that  it  will 
not  be  productive  of  unmixed  good,  nor  of  so  much  good  to  Great 
Britain,  as  the  anti-corn-law  agitators  expect.  But,  admitting,  as  I 
do,  the  soundness  of  the  free  trade  policy,  I  do  not  like  mixing  up 
subjects  of  ordinary  legislation  with  questions  of  international  diplo- 
macy. I  think  it  is  neither  judicious  nor  expedient  to  tie  down  our 
legislative  action  iu  regard  of  duties  on  imports  by  a  treaty  with  a 
foreign  power.  It  is  impolitic  to  connect  our  legislation  on  such 
subjects,  in  any  way,  even  in  discussion,  with  foreign  affairs.  Such 
a  course  is  the  most  likely  thing  in  the  world  to  produce  a  powerful 
reaction,  and  to  injure  the  cause  of  the  free  trade  advocates.  The 
suspicion  that  duties  were  lowered  to  gratify  England,  and  obtain  u 
large  slice  of  the  Oregon  territory,  would  be  enough  to  create  a  host 
of  enemies  to  such  reduction.  This  would  present  a  point  of  attack 
which  the  friends  of  a  high  tariff  would  not  fail  to  assault.  Let  us 
always,  in  forming  a  tariff,  arrange  it  not  only  with  our  oicn  inter- 
ests really,  but  also  professedly  and  exclusively  in  view.  Foreign 
nations  ought  to  expect,  and  do  expect  nothing  else  from  us.  Still 
if  the  adjustment  of  the  tariff  and  of  the  corn  laws  can  afford  any 
loop-hole  for  the  two  cabinets  to  get  extricated  from  their  difficulties, 
let  other  considerations  yield  for  the  sake  of  such  an  important  pur- 
pose. A  war  between  the  two  countries  would,  in  all  likelihood, 
cause  more  damage  to  both,  than  all  the  impolitic  legislation  about 
tariffs  and  corn  laws  has  done  during  the  last  half  century. 

But  I  suspect  that  there  is  no  foundation  whatever  for  this  very 
improbable  rumor.  I  am  afraid  that  all  the  various  rumors  that 
promise  a  speedy  settlement  of  the  controversy,  are  destitute  of  any 
solid  foundation,  and  that  they  are  merely  the  offspring  of  the  hopes 
and  wishes  of  those  with  whom  they  originate.  About  the  middle 
of  January  all  the  rumors  were  of  a  pacific  character.  And  yet 
the  secrets  of  the  cabinet,  when  they  came  to  be  disclosed,  were  far 
from  being  calculated  to  encourage  hopes  of  peace.  I  fear  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  same  disappointment,  through  the  obstinacy  of  our  exec- 
utive. I  should  not  be  surprised  if  the  next  revelation  from  the 
cabinet  should  inform  us  of  the  peremptory  rejection  of  a  declared 
ultimatum.  What  might  follow  that  event,  I  venture  not  to  say. 
Probably  a  defiance — a  declaration  that  any  intrusion  on  the  north 


MV' 


32 


side  of  the  Columbia,  would  be  considered  a  commencement  of  hos- 
tilities. Perhaps  something  even  more  prompt  than  that.  If  Great 
Britain  once  becomes  persuaded  that  the  controversy  must  end  in  an 
appeal  to  arms,  she  is  not  likely  to  wait  till  we  have  prepared  our- 
selves for  the  contest  and  arranged  our  difficulties  with  Mexico. 
Still  when  I  contemplate  the  extreme  folly  and  wickedness  of  a  war 
about  such  a  matter,  I  cannot  but  think  a  collision  between  the 
countries  almost  impossible.  I  am  strongly  inclined  to  hope  a  fa- 
vorable result  of  the  controversy.  But,  what  is  mortifying,  this 
hope  rests  rather  on  the  forbearance  and  magnanimity  of  Great 
Britain,  than  upon  the  wisdom  of  our  public  counsels. 

The  very  pacific  news,  which  has  arrived  from  England  since  I 
wrote  the  preceding  paragraph,  would  not  induce  me  to  change  a 
single  syllable.  This  news  (except,  perhaps,  the  remarks  of  Mr. 
Peel  on  Mr.  Pakenham's  rejection  of  the  compromise  offered  by  Mr. 
Buchanan)  was  what  was  to  be  expected,  when  we  consider  th3 
nature  of  the  instructions  under  which  Mr.  Pakenham  must  have 
acted  in  making  his  twice  repeated  offer  of  arbitration.  Every  man, 
who  was  at  all  acquainted  with  the  present  temper  and  feelings  of 
the  British  people  and  of  the  British  government,  knew  from  the 
beginning  that  Great  Britain  would  wage  no  war  with  us,  if  she 
could  avoid  it  with  honor — if  she  should  not  he  provoked  to  it  by  in- 
solence and  bullying,  as  well  as  injustice  on  ihe  part  of  our  govern- 
ment. The  knowledge  of  this  fact,  I  fear,  has  been  a  principal 
cause  of  the  insolent  attitude  assumed  by  many  of  our  statesmen, 
and  of  the  unreasonable  claims  of  the  administration,  and  in  this 
mcinner  the  means  of  retarding,  or  even  endangering  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  controversy.  The  whole  danger  lies  on  this  side 
the  Atlantic.  The  news  from  Washington  is  much  more  to  be  re- 
garded than  the  news  from  England,  if  we  would  judge  correctly  of 
the  probable  issue  of  the  negotiation.  The  language  used  in  parlia- 
ment is  certainly  pacific,  eminently  conciliatory — calculated  to  ad- 
minister a  tacit  rebuke  to  the  noisy,  frothy  blusterers  in  the  chambers 
of  congress — but  it  is  at  the  same  time  firm.*     I  am  only  afraid  in 


*  The  emphatic  remarks  of  Mr.  Hume  are  especially  worthy  of  notice  on  this 
side  the  Atlantic.  They  exhibit  the  feelings  of  disappointment  and  regret  with 
which  the  warmest  friends  of  liberal  institutions  regard  the  course  recently  pursued 
by  this  government.  They  show  also,  that  if  Britain  should,  unfortunately,  he 
forced  into  a  war  on  this  question,  her  people  will  enter  into  it  with  more  perfect 
unanimity  than  they  have  entered  into  any  war  during  the  last  eighty  years. 


33 


ent  of  hos- 
.  If  Great 
3t  end  in  an 
■pared  our- 
th  Mexico. 
ss  of  a  war 
etween  the 
hope  a  fa- 
tifying,  this 
ty  of  Great 

and  since  I 
Lo  change  a 
arks  of  Mr. 
ered  by  Mr, 
;onsider  th3 
must  have 
Every  man, 
i  feelings  of 
;w  from  the 
1  us,  if  she 
to  it  by  in- 
our  govern- 
a  principal 
statesmen, 
and  in  this 
,he  peaceful 
jn  this  side 
jre  to  be  re- 
Icorrectly  of 
id  in  parlia- 
llated  to  ad- 
le  chambers 
lly  afraid  in 

Inotice  on  this 

regret  with 

bently  pursued 

^rtunately,  be 

more  perfect 

■years. 


regard  of  it,  that  the  administration  at  Washington  and  the  public, 
looking  exclusively  to  lis  pacific  spirit,  may  be  induced  by  it  to  be- 
come more  obstinate  and  perlinacious  in  their  unreasonable  demands, 
instead  of  magnanimously  imitating  the  conciliatory  spirit  manifested 
by  British  statesmen  of  all  parties. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  President  and  his  cabinet  wish  to  plunge 
the  country  into  war,  much  less  that  they  wish  to  plunge  it  into  war 
to  injure  the  wealthy  and  commercial  classes  of  the  community.     I 
believe  that  they  do  not  expect  that  the  course  which  they  are  pur- 
suing, will  plunge  it  into  war.     I  attribute  the  blame  of  bringing  the 
controversy  with  Great  Britain  to  its  present  position  to  no  such 
malirrnant  feelings  towards  Great  Britain,  and  still  less  to  such  ma- 
lignant  feelings  towards  the  wealthy,  commercial  and  planting  in- 
terests of  the  country,  as  have  been  ascribed,  I  hope  altogether 
unjustly,  to  some  of  the   President's  supporters.     If  a  war   were 
likely  to  occur,  a  wise  administration  would  use  every  effort  to  gain 
the  favor  of  the  classes  who  command  the  disposable  capital  of  the 
country,    as  the  success  of  an  jidniinistration  in  time  of  war  must 
depend  greatly  on  the  ready  and  cordial  co-operation  of  these  classes 
—I  mean  the   capitalists  and  wealthy  merchants.     I  ascribe  the 
present  position  of  our  relations  with  Great  Britain  altogether  to  the 
obstinacy  of  Mr.  Polk.*     He  took  a  rash  step,  without  due  reflec- 
tion on  the  probable  consequences,    in  his  inaugural    address,  in 
response  to  an  unwise  resolution  adopted,  for  the  purpose  of  creat- 
ing •'  political  capital,"  by  a  few  irresponsible  men  at  Baltimore  on 
the  occasion  of  his  nomination ;  and  he  is  determined  to  exhibit 
consistency  and  firmness  in  following  it  up. 

Some  have  attached  the  blame  of  the  harshness  with  which  the 
negotiation  has  been  managed  by  the  administration,  to  Mr. 
Buchanan,  I  suspect,  unjustly.  He  has  had  to  do  the  best  he  could 
to  defend  the  false  step  taken  by  the  President  and  by  his  party  at 

*  We  have  reason  to  believe,  from  the  account  which  Mr.  Polk's  friends  give  of 
him,  that  he  is  obstinate.  They  call  it  firmness  ;  but  firmness  and  inflexibility  in 
a  bad  cause  is  obstinacy.  Let  tho^o  wliom  it  concerns,  and  especially  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  endeavor  to  guard  in  time  against  the  consequences  of  this 
infl3xibiliiy — this  iron  will  of  the  President.  It  miy  bnng  on  us  a  war,  contrary  to 
his  original  intention — a  war,  if  the  British  government  will  not  come  to  such 
terms  as  will  enable  him  to  justify  his  fiist  rash,  and  again  obstinately  reiterated 
claim  to  the  whole  of  the  Oregon  territory.  In  th'a  dangerous  policy  the  President 
may  perad venture  succeed  and  be  applauded  ;  but  not  by  those  wiio  have  a  regard 
for  the  true  honor  of  the  country. 


■■f 


ijil 


II 'I 


84 

Baltimore ;  and  if,  as  has  been  alleged,  he  sits  uneasy  in  the  seat 
which  he  at  present  occupies,  I  am  inclined  to  conjecture,  that,  not- 
withstanding all  the  glory  obtained  by  "  laying  Mr.  Pakcnham  on 
his  back,"*  the  cause  is  rather  that  he  dues  not  exactly  like  the 
work  in  which  he  is  engaged — the  course  of  policy  which  he  is 
defendinji,  than  that  Mr.  Polk  is  dissatisfied  with  his  harshness  in 
manairinj;  the  neffotiation. 

In  censuring  the  course  pursued  by  the  administration  in  the 
management  of  this  controversy,  I  would  notice  one  very  important 
transaction,  which  seems  not  to  have  met  with  such  public  animad- 
version as  it  deserves.     It  is  the  publication,  with  the  President's 
message,  of  the  correspondence  with  Mr.  Pakenham.     This  cxj)arte 
statement  ought  never  to  have  been  published,  whilst  there  was  any 
hope  of  settling  the  question  by  negotiation.      I  call  it  an  ex  parte 
statement,  because  such  it  really  was,  since  Mr.  Pakenham  must 
obviously    have  felt  himself  precluded,   by  a  sense  of  duty,  from 
making  any  reply  to  Mr.  Buchanan's  last  letter,  in  which  Mr.  Polk's 
extraordinary  claims  in  regard  of  Oregon  were  so  elaborately  de- 
fended.    If  we  suppose  Mr.  Polk  to  have  acted,  as  he  is  bound  in 
duty  to  do,  on  public  principles — to  subserve  the  interests  of  his 
country,  and  not  some  paltry  personal  or  party  purpose — the  publi- 
cation of  this  correspondence  is  irreconcilable  with  the  dictates  of 
ordinary  prudence,  except  upon  the  hypothesis  that  Mr.  Polk  con- 
sidered  war  between  the  two  countries  inevitable,  and  that  "the 
hearts  of  the  people"  were  to  be  prepared  for  this  result ;  or  on  the 
hypothesis  that  Great  Britain  might,  by  the  exhibition  of  a  bold 
front  and  extravagant  pretensions — by  rousing  the  feelings  of  the 
democracy,  be  bullied  and  frightened  into  a  surrender  of  her  claims.t 
The  first  of  these  two  suppositions  seems  to  be  denied  by  the  imme- 
diate friends  of  the  administration,  who  generally  maintain,  in  public 
and  in  private,  that  we  are  to  have  a  .speedy  settlement  of  the  con- 
troversy ;  it  is  also  discountenanced  by  the  fact,  that  no  adequate 


;    ii 

1 

' 

,1 

* 

1 

■ 

J 
i 

■ 

i 

1 
i 

1 

! 

i 

n 

# 

. 

i 

*  This  vainglorious  boast  was  made  long  before  the  correspondence  was  pub- 
lished, and  therefore  most  likely  emanated  from  tlu;  cabinet.  Thus  originating,  it 
was  unhandsome,  and  deserves  reproof.  The  secrecy  preserved  as  to  the  nature  of 
ihe  correspondence  deserves  commendation. 

t  The  chief  motives  for  the  premature  publication  of  the  correspondence,  no 
doubt,  were  to  justify  Mr.  Polk's  unfortunate  assertion  of  a  claim  to  the  whole  of 
Oregon  in  his  inaugural,  and  to  glorify  Mr.  Buchanan,  and  perhaps  subserve  certain 
other  purposes — to  gain  "political  capital." 


35 


in  the  seat 
,  tliiit,  not- 
icnliam  on 
ly  like  the 
liich  he  is 
rshness  in 

ion  in  the 
imporiant 
lie  animad- 
President's 
liis  fx parte 
:re  was  any 
an  cz  parte 
11  ham  must 
duty,  from 
Mr.  Polk's 
borately  de- 
s  hound  in 
rests  of  his 
—the  publi- 
dictates  of 
Polk  con- 
that  "the 
;  or  on  the 
n  of  a  bold 
ings  of  the 
ler  claims.t 
y  the  imme- 
n,  in  public 
of  the  con- 
no  adequate 

ence  was  pub- 
originating,  it 
o  the  nature  of 

?spontlence,  no 
o  the  whole  of 
ibserve  certain 


preparations  are  made,  or  means  demanded  for  commencing  war. 
If  the  latter  be  the  true  hypothesis,  the  attempt  to  bully  and  intimi- 
date England  is,  in  my  opinion,  equally  drtngerous  and  dishonorable. 
An  attempt  which,  even  if  it  should  in  part  succeed,  wi!'  not  be 
eventually  strviceable  to  this  country.  Tt  will  injure  our  rej)utation 
— it  has  already  done  so — and  may  embarrass  us  in  fi. ture  negotia- 
tions with  foreign  states.  In  the  mean  time  we  run  the  risk  of 
pushing  Great  Britain  to  such  extremity  that  she  may  feel  compelled, 
by  a  sense  of  honor,  a  regard  for  her  reputation  with  the  nations  of 
Christendom,  to  resist  by  force  our  unreasonable  claims.  It  is 
possible  to  calculate  too  securely  on  the  pacific  disposition  of  Sir 
Robert  Peel  and  Lord  Aberdeen  and  (he  British  people. 

Great  Britain  may  probaby,  if  we  do  not  touch  her  on  the  point 
of  honor,  yield  some  portion  of  what  she  considers  her  just  rights  in 
treating  with  us,  from  the  same  motives  that  a  respectable  person 
will  yield  something  of  his  just  claims  to  a  very  litigious  and  un- 
pleasant neighbor,  in  order  that  he  may  rid  himself  of  annoyance. 
In  such  a  transaction  it  is  the  successful  party  that  is  placed  in  the 
most  humiliating  position.  If  we  pursue  the  course  pursued  by 
President  Jackson  in  violently  enforcing  the  treaty  of  indemnifica- 
tion of  losses  of  American  citizens,  formed  with  the  king  of  the 
French,  and  the  course  now  pursued  by  President  Polk,  we  shall 
soon  acquire  a  character  for  obstinacy  and  grasping  higgling  diplo- 
macy that  will  little  conduce  to  gain  us  friends,  if,  on  any  occasion 
in  the  vicissitude  of  human  affairs,  we  should  need  sympathy  and 
friendship. 

We  may  trace  the  course  of  this  higgling  overreaching  diploma- 
cy in  a  great  measure  to  the  fact  that  our  negotiators  are  generally 
aspirants  to  the  presidency,  and  that  it  aj)pears  to  them  that  the  besi 
way  to  recommend  themselves  to  the  public  is  by  driving  a  hard 
bargain  with  foreign  states  in  all  negotiatiojis,  whether  about  terri- 
tory or  about  compensation  for  damages,  &/C.  They  are  thus  led  in 
their  transactions  abroad  to  act  rather  on  the  principles  of  the  crafty, 
chaffering  small  dealer,  {\he  pcrjldus  catipo,)  than  those  of  the  man 
of  hojior,  the  (jetitleman.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  negotiators 
appear  not  to  be  altogether  mistaken  in  their  estimate  of  the  road 
to  popularity. 

By  this  overreaching  policy  we  may  gain  a  few  millions  of  doK 
lars,  or  a  few  thousand  miles  of  territory,  worthless  to  ourselves  and 
to  every  body  else,  and  lose  character  and  standing  among  the  na- 


36 


i 


tions — get  the  reputation  of  a  grasping,  avaracinus,  dishonest  people, 
who  will  on  all  occasions  take  advantage  both  of  the  weakness  and 
of  the  good  nature  of  their  neighbors  to  enrich  themselves.  How 
ever  others  may  estimate  these  things,  this  is  not  the  character 
which  I  would  like  any  country  having  a  claim  on  my  love  to 
acquire. 

It  may  be  observed,  as  worthy  of  the  severest  censure,  that  our 
government  has  of  late  got  into  n  habit  of  making  very  loud  and 
gratuitous  professions  of  moderation  and  even  disinterestedness 
when  the  policy  pursued  is  of  the  most  questionable  character.  Of 
this  we  have  a  striking  example  in  our  diplomacy  with  Mexico — 
grasping  at  her  provinces,  and  at  the  same  time  professing  to  be  her 
best  friend.  Together  with  these  professions,  wc  usually  couple 
abuse  of  other  nations.  Now  all  this  is  in  very  bad  taste,  to  pass 
over  its  morality^  which  is  Machiavelian  and  infamous.  It  never 
imposes  on  foreign  nations.  Sagacious  men  are  awakened  by  it  to 
suspicion,  wjien  before  they  may  have  seen  no  cause  for  suspicioki ; 
and  it  disgusts  men  of  sense  both  at  home  and  abroad.  Nor  does 
this  conduct  produce  much  effect  wilh  those  who  are  most  ready  to 
swallow  all  these  hypocritical  pretensions  of  moderation.  Such 
persons  generally  care  nothing  whether  the  country  has  a  character 
for  moderation  and  honorable  dealing  or  not;  success  with  them 
is  the  criterion  of  the  propriety  of  every  measure  ;  as  to  wrong,  they 
feel  altogether  indifferent,  provided  their  own  country  is  aggrandized. 

In  this  connexion  allow  me  to  notice  another  shallow  and  dan- 
gerous opinion  which  seems  to  be  fast  gaining  ground  among  us — 
no  longer  confined,  as  formerly,  to  the  ignorantly  patriotic  and  the 
demagogues,  but  finding  its  way  to  higher  places,  and  which  exer- 
cises much  influence  over  the  public  mind  in  reference  to  the  Ore- 
gon controversy.  It  is  the  opinion  that  our  own  form  of  government, 
or  rather,  I  should  have  said,  ou;  own  government,  is  not  only  the 
best  on  earth,  but  that  it  is  the  only  one  fit  to  be  tolerated  among 
men.  That  our  own  government,  if  we  do  not  corrupt  it,  is  the  best 
for  us,  all  men  here  are  generally  agreed.  To  the  assertion  that  it 
is  the  best  on  earth,  when  men  are  fitted  to  manage  it  wisely  and 
enjoy  it,  I  will  not  object.  But  that  it  is  the  only  government  fitted 
for  mankind,  and  that  all  other  governments  are  usurpations,  tyran- 
nies, systems  of  oppression,  is  both  an  extravagant  and  a  dangerous 
doctrine.  Nor  is  it  an  indigenous  plant  of  this  soil ;  it  has  been 
transplanted  from  the  gardens  of  the  Jacobin  Club.     Such  exclusive 


^^ 


37 


mest  people, 
eakncss  and 
ves.     llow 
3   characler 
my  love    to 

ire,  that  our 
ry  loud  and 
terestedness 
iracter.  Of 
li  Mexico — 
ng  to  be  her 
iaily  couple 
aste,  to  pass 
3.  It  never 
Jiied  by  it  to 
r  suspicioki ; 
Nor  does 
lost  ready  to 
lion.     Such 

a  character 

vvilh  them 
wrong,  they 
ggrandized. 
ow  and  dan- 
among  us — 
otic  and  the 
which  exer- 

to  the  Ore- 
rovernment, 
lot  only  the 
ated  among 
t,  is  the  best 

rtion  that  it 
t  wisely  and 
iment  titted 

tions,  tyran- 
a  dangerous 

it  has  been 

ch  exclusive 


views  of  forms  of  government  are  of  a  similar  nature  to  exclusive 
forms  of  faith  in  religion,  and  tend  to  produce  the  same  baneful 
effects.  The  bigoi  in  politics  is  the  counterpart  of  the  bigot  in  reli- 
gion. With  the  Mormons,  both  say  we  are  the  "  saints,"  and  not 
only  heaven  but  earth  was  designed  as  the  peculiar  inheritance  of 
ourselves  and  tiie  seat  of  our  institutions.  If  we  can  cheat  and 
overreach  the  heathen,  it  i3  all  conducive  to  the  service  of  religion, 
says  the  one  species  of  bigot — of  liberty,  says  the  other.  Thus  the 
eternal  principles  of  justice  are  set  at  defiance,  if  they  stand  in  the 
way  of  democratic  institutions.  It  is  forgotten  that  to  set  an  exam- 
ple of  justice  and  to  inculcate  strict  principles  of  justice  is  neces- 
sary to  the  prosperity  of  every  state,  and  to  none  more  necessary 
than  to  a  republic — necessary  in  reference  to  internal  peace  and 
prosperity — necessary  to  the  successful  management  of  its  foreign 
relations.  A  nation  which  imitates  Mormon  bigotry  and  exclusive- 
ness  will  soon  fmd  itself  in  the  position  of  Ishmael.  "  He  will  be  a 
wild  man;  his  hand  will  be  against  every  man,  and  every  man's 
hand  will  be  against  him."  Instead  of  this  we  ought  to  adopt  and 
act  on  the  same  wise  and  liberal  principles  of  toleration  in  political 
doctrines  which  we  have  successfully  adopted  in  regard  of  religion; 
and  as  we  allow  every  man  to  worship  his  creator  and  seek  heaven 
in  his  own  way,  so  to  approve  of  every  nation  being  allowed,  with- 
out coming  under  the  ban  of  our  denunciations,  to  seek  the  estab- 
lishment of  political  order  in  its  own  wiy.  Regarding,  in  our  na- 
tional capacity,  the  varieties  in  political  institutions  with  the  same 
tolerance  as  we  regard  the  various  forms  of  Christianity  among 
ourselves,  it  ought  to  be  our  ambition,  our  pride,  to  hold  a  conspic- 
uous rank  among  the  civilized  states  of  the  world — conspicuous  not 
merely  on  account  of  our  power  and  efficiency  both  in  the  arts  of 
peace  and  war,  but  for  a  generosity  and  magnanimity  becoming 
our  high  station,  and  the  glorious  destinies  which  await  us,  if  our 
own  follies  and  crimes  prevent  not. 

It  may  be  inquired,  what  ought  the  peace-loving  part  of  the  com- 
munity to  do  in  the  present  state  of  the  controversy?  No  unani- 
mous response  has  yet  been  made  to  this  question  ;  and  hence  little 
associated  effort  has  been  made  to  influence  the  course  of  the  gov- 
ernment  in  regard  of  this  matter.  The  general  opinion  seems  to  be 
that  those  who  are  opposed  to  the  measures  of  the  <id ministration 
should  sit  with  folded  hands,  and  leave  all  the  responsibility  to  rest 
on  the  executive  and  on  the  party  which  has  raised  him  to  power. 


ill 


38 

Some  advise  this  course,  and  even  more,  to  facilitate  all  the  mea- 
sures demanded  by  the  executive,  because  they  hope  that  the  result — 
whether  peace  or  war — will  be  advantageous  to  the  ir  own  party,  and 
fatal  to  the  party  of  the  President ;  others,  because  they  suppose 
that  it  is  the  course  most  likely  to  moderate  the  action  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  to  secure  eventually  the  adoption  of  peaceful  mea- 
sures. The  motives  of  the  first  of  these  two  claswes  are  too  selfish, 
unmanly,  unpatriotic  to  deserve  any  further  notice.  It  is  not  so 
with  the  latter.  They  mean  well,  whatever  may  be  thought  v.-ftheir 
wisdom.  They  fear  the  eifect  of  excitement  on  this  question.  Some 
of  them  are  even  apprehensive  that  if  the  commercial  and  intelligent 
classes  openly  and  firmly  oppose  the  policy  of  the  administration,  it 
will  stimulate  the  friends  of  the  executive  to  plunge  the  country 
into  war  in  order  to  injure  the  commercial  class  and  the  interests  of 
the  Atlantic  States  in  general.  Such  fears  as  these  are  insinuiited 
by  some  of  the  editors  and  correspondents  of  our  public  papeib. 
These  insinuations  I  believe  to  be  grossly  slanderous.  Thoujih  I 
have  little  confidence  in  the  wisdom  of  our  rulers,  I  do  not  entertain 
such  notions  of  their  morality  and  patriotism  and  regard  for  their 
fellow-citizens,  as  these  insinuations  imply.  Nor  do  I  believe  any 
thing  so  bad  as  this  of  any  large  portion  of  the  western  supporters 
of  the  President.  If  it  were  come  to  this,  that  a  party,  under  the 
influence  of  such  malignant  feelings  against  a  portion  of  their  fel- 
low-citizens, strong  enough  to  carry  measures  so  important  in  our 
public  councils,  existed  in  the  country,  then  verily  might  we  despair 
.of  the  republic.  There  may  be  a  few  such  men  in  the  country  ; 
but  if  ever,  unfortunately,  they  should  become  the  majority,  we  shall 
rapidly  sink  to  the  level  of  our  sister  republics  south  of  us  on  this 
continent,  or  even  to  a  lower  deep — to  the  level  of  the  French  Re- 
public during  the  Reign  of  Terror. 

Again — many  of  both  political  parties  who  are  sincerely  dee  ous 
that  peace  may  be  maintained,  stand  in  this  kind  of  position.  They 
are  sorry  that  the  administration  have,  by  claiming  the  whole  terri- 
tory west  of  the  Rocky  Mountain;.?,  endangered  the  issue  of  the  ne- 
gotiation; but  yet,  since  the  step  ha«  been  taken,  they  think  it  best 
to  offer  no  open  resistance.  Tliis  course  some  follow  through  re- 
gard for  their  party,  some  through  patriotism,  j)erhaps  more  through 
the  hope  that,  by  setting  up  a  large  claim,  the  President  may  suc- 
ceed in  obtaining  a  better  bargain  from  the  British  government. 
With  none  of  these  classes  can  I  exactly  agree.      The  party  spirit 


39 


I  the  mea- 
e  result — 
;)arty,  and 
7  suppose 
'  the  gov- 
eful  mea- 

00  selfish, 
is  not  so 

hi  \,-r«heir 
n.  Some 
ntelligent 
tration,  it 
e  country 
iteres^s  of 
nsinuated 
ic  papeia. 
rhough  I 
entertain 

1  for  their 
elieve  any 

upporters 
inder  the 
their  fei- 
nt in  our 
ve  despair 
country  ; 
we  shall 
s  on  this 
ench  Re- 

f  des   ous 

n.     They 

ole  terri- 

f  the  ne- 

t)k  it  hest 

rough  re- 

i  through 

niay  suc- 

^ernment. 

irty  spirit 


that  would,  by  a  criminal  inaction,  sacrifice  the  interests  of  the  country 
to  the  c.iprice  or  the  obstinacy  of  a  leader,  I  consider  detestable. 
True  patriotism  and  a  genuine  spirit  of  indepenrlence,  1  think,  would 
point  to  quite  a  different  course  from  that  of  silence  and  non-resist- 
ance, when  we  believe  our  rulers  are  acting  wrong,  and  that  in  an 
affair  that  may  prove  to  be  of  the  last  importance  to  the  honor  and 
interests  of  the  republic.  And  least  of  all  can  I  agree  with  th^se 
who  remain  silent  through  the  secret  or  avowed  expectation  that  the 
course  pursued  by  the  President  may  enable  us  to  obtain  a  better 
bargain  in  the  negotiation.  Of  this  chaffering,  higgling  method  of 
managing  negotiations  with  foreign  powers,  I  have  spoken  freely 
already.  This  sc'tiug  up  of  exorbitant  claims — askiug  a  high  price 
in  order  to  drive  an  advantageous  bargain — is  a  mean,  pedlar-like 
policy,  altogether  unbecoming  in  a  great  nation,  and  altogether  im- 
proper to  be  pursued  in  negotiating  with  a  great  and  high-minded 
nation.  It  is  also  calculated  to  involve  the  adtninistration  which 
pursues  it  in  difficulties.  It  may  do  so  to  a  serious  extent  in  the 
present  case.  When  the  President  asserts  a  claim  to  the  whole  of 
Oregon,  nmny  of  his  partisans  believe  that  he  is  in  earnest,  whether 
he  is  so  or  not ;  and  should  he  choose  to  relinquish  his  extreme  de- 
mands, it  is  not  certain  that  he  could  carry  enough  of  his  friends 
along  with  him  to  give  sanction  to  a  treaty  founded  on  reasonable 
principles. 

It  is  in  n»y  opinion  the  best  and  the  safest  policy  for  those  who 
are  opposed  to  important  measures,  to  speak  out,  in  a  manly  way  and 
at  a  proper  time,  their  real  sentiments.  This  course  may  possibly 
facilitate,  instead  of  impeding,  the  action  of  the  administration,  by 
helping  to  prepare  the  country  for  the  relinquishment  of  the  ex- 
treme claims  of  the  President.  And  now  is  the  proper  time  to  speak 
aloud.  The  whole  subject  is  before  the  public — referred  to  the  re- 
presentatives of  the  people.  Whilst  it  was  confined  within  the  cab- 
inet, and  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  treaty-making  depart- 
ment of  government,  the  propriety  and  prudence  of  meddling  with 
it  might  be  doubted.  But  now  the  question  is  before  the  Senate, 
arid  it  is  in  the  power  of  that  body  to  modify  essentially  the  course 
of  policy  which  shall  be  adopted  in  regard  to  this  matter.  It  is  not 
perhaps  too  much  to  say,  that  to  decide  for  peace  or  war  is  now  in 
their  power. 

I  believe  it  to  be  the  duty  of  all  those  who  do  not  wish  a  war  on 
account  of  the  subject  in  dispute — of  all  those  who  think  that  the 


'!>5J0'. 


fil 


^i!f 


40 

claims  presented  by  Mr.  Buch.nnan  in  his  letler  of  August  SClli,  1845, 
are  untenable,  to  declare  so  in  a  manner  that  is  not  to  be  mistaken. 
Especially  all  those  who  are  opposed  to  the  step  of  giving  uncondi- 
tional notice  of  the  abrogation  of  ihe  convention  of  1818,  consider- 
ing ihis  notice  a  measure  likely  to  endanger  our  peaceful  relations 
with  Great  Britain  in  the  present  crisis  of  the  negotiation,  ought  to 
speak  out  and  give  the  support  of  their  authority  and  influence  to 
that  portion  of  our  Senators  who  are  disposed  to  resist  the  measures 
recommended  by  the  President  in  relation  to  the  Oregon  territory. 
If  some  of  these  measures  receive  the  sanction  of  the  Legislature, 
they  will  certainly  endanger  the  peace  of  the  two  nations,  whether 
the  President  and  those  who  enact  them  intend  so  or  not.     If  the 
notice  is  given,  either  we  must  proceed  to  farther  measures,  which 
may  produce  hostilities,  or  place  ourselves  in  a  very  awkward  and 
humiliating  position  before  the  world.      I  agree  entirely  with  those 
who  think  that,  on  various  account:*,  the  notice,  in  no  shape,  ong'  • 
to  be  given  at  present.  If,  indeed,  the  notice  were  gii^en  in  the  ■■■■■:■-■. 
ner  proposed  by  one  of  the  amendments  offered  to  the  resolutions 
before  the  Senate,  viz.,  accompanied  with  an  offer  of  arbitration,  it 
could  do  no  harm ;  on  the  contrary,  it  would  effectually  satisfy  the 
public  mind  in  both  countries  that  all  danger  was  past ;  but  since  the 
publication  of  the  late  correspondence,  it  appears  useless  to  talk  of 
this.     The  only  hopeful  plan  in  the  present  aspect  of  the  business  is, 
as  it  seems  to  me,  to  defeat  the  resolution  to  give  notice.    Those  who 
think  so  ought  to  make  their  opinion  known  in   time.      They  may 
suppose  that  this  is  suflicienll;/  done  by  the  private  correspondence 
of  individuals,  possessed  of  influence  and  consideration,  with  the 
Senators.     Or  they  may  be  willing  to  leave  the  matter  to  the  rran- 
agementof  the  public  press- — the  gentlemen  of  the  fourth  estate,  as  it 
has  been  called.     These  gentlemen  seem  to  be  willing  enough  to 
take  the  whole  management  of  the  matter  on  their  own  shoulders. 
I  have,  I  confess,  much  more  faith  in  the  good,  old,  regular,  manly 
way  of  getting  up  petitions.     It  may  not  be  necessary  to  call  public 
meetings — perhaps  it  might  be  imprudent  to  call  them.     They  are 
certainly  often  called  for  far  less  important  purposes,  and  on  ques- 
tions not  less  likely  to  excite  violent  party  opposition.  If  nicetings  are 
called,  the  language  held  at  them  should  be  that  of  moderation — not  of 
denunciation  ;  the  same  of  petitions.     Nor  is  it  necessary  that  these 
petitions  should  all  be  of  a  similar  tenor.     They  ought  to  be  suited 
to  the  varying  opinions  of  those  who,  whilst  they  agree  in  endeavor 


ust  3Ctl),l  84r>, 
'  be  mistaken, 
ving  uncondi- 
B18,  corisider- 
leful  relations 
tion,  ought  to 
I  influence  to 
;  the  measures 
gon  territory. 
;  Legislature, 
ions,  whether 
r  not.  If  the 
asures,  which 
awkward  and 
2ly  with  those 
>  shnpe  onn' ^ 
n  in  thp  •  ;  . 
e  resolutions 
arbitration,  it 
ily  satisfy  the 
but  since  the 
ess  to  talk  of 
le  business  is, 

Those  who 
They  may 
rrespondence 
on,  with  the 

to  the  man- 
h  estate,  as  it 
g  enough  to 
n  shoulders, 
gular,  manly 
o  call  public 
They  are 
ind  on  ques- 
mcetintrs  are 
ition — not  of 
ry  that  these 

to  be  suited 
in  endeavor 


41 


ing  to  avert  the  r  se  of  war,  yet  differ  in  their  views  of  some  ques- 
tions connected  with  the  controversy.  The  crisis  seems  to  demand 
an  emphatic  expression  of  the  opinions  of  the  intelligent  and  weal- 
fliy  classes — those  who,  if  a  war  should  unfortunately  occur,  will  be 
called  upon  to  support  its  heaviest  pecuniary  burdens,  whilst  at  the 
same  time  their  business  is  suspended  or  deranged,  and  their  proper- 
ty destroyed  or  depreciated.  Why  not  rouse  yourselves,  I  would 
say  to  such,  and  do  your  duty  to  yonrselves  and  to  the  republic*  If 
you  neglect  your  duty  now,  you  may  have  deep  and  lasting  cause  to 
repent  of  your  neglect  hereafter. 

Yours,  &/C. 


LETTER   IV. 

NeW'Yorhy  February,  1846. 
Dear  Sir  : 

In  the  present  letter  I  design  to  call  your  attention  briefly  to 
some  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers  which  are  to  be  apprehended,  if 
we  should  unfortunately  engage  in  war  with  Great  Britain.  Though 
there  is  at  present  ground  to  hope  that  such  a  conflict  may  not  hap- 
pen in  our  days,  yet  it  is  good  to  bear  in  mind  the  hazards  with 
which  it  would  be  attended,  especially  as  a  proper  sense  of  these  is 
the  best  security,  so  far  as  regards  the  influence  and  action  of  too 
many  of  our  citizens,  against  our  rushing  recklessly  into  the  hor- 
rois  of  war.  I  am  the  more  inclined  to  notice  this  subje,  ;t,  because 
I  ♦'))!ik  the  difliculties  of  such  a  war  as  we  should  have  to  wage  with 
'  ''lu  Britain  are  not  fully  appreciated  by  the  present  generation. 
Ti.  1  lessons  of  past  experience  seem  to  be  in  a  great  measure  for- 
gotten. NoUiing  but  the  exaggerated  glories  of  the  conflict  in  which 
our  fathers  were  engngcd,  is  generally  remembered  ;  the  difficulties 
and  (lisasi.  i  i  have  been  permitted  to  sink  into  oblivion.  In  treating 
this  subject,  I  will  pass  very  lightly  over  those  matters  which  are 
open  to  the  observation  of  the  most  cursory  inquirer,  and  confine  my 
atteniion  chiefly  to  those  which  are  most  likely  to  pass  unnoticed, 
especially  by  observers  strongly  influenced  by  national  prejudices. 
Fo.'  a  more  full  and  authuritative  account  of  the  financial  difliculties 


•  (I 


Quin  expergiscimiwi  gitur,  et  copessite  rempublicam." 


42 


if 


t;ii 


■? 


i'''i 


which  would  attend  such  a  war,  I  refer  to  the  able  pamphlet  of  Mr. 
Gallatin. 

And  here  I  would  notice,  first,  the  greatly  increased  power  of 
England  since  1812  ;  and  the  fact  that  she  is  now  so  disengaged  that 
she  could  bring  this  whole  power  to  bear  upon  us.  I  know  it  is  the 
fashion  with  some  of  our  demagogues  to  speak  of  England  as  de- 
crepid,  and  as  tottering  under  the  weight  of  her  national  debt.  The 
national  debt  is  a  great  evil — the  increase  of  it  would  be  a  great  and 
a  dangerous  evil.  This  is  well  understood  in  England — and  an 
increase  either  of  her  debt  or  of  her  taxation  will  be  avoided,  if  pos- 
sible, by  her  wisest  statesmen.  But  notwithstanding  this,  England 
is  immensely  richer — or,  what  is  more  to  the  purpose,  has  more  dis- 
posable wealth  at  her  command,  at  present,  than  at  any  past  period 
of  her  existence  as  a  nation.  And,  if  a  war  is  forced  upon  her,  this 
wealth  would  l  ^  v^  profusely  employed  for  the  purpose  of  annoy- 
ing and  humbling  opponent.  It  is,  in  fairness,  to  be  admitted 
that  this  country  has  grown,  during  the  same  period,  in  wealth  and 
population  still  more  rapidly — in  a  greater  ratio — than  England.  But 
undisciplined  numbers  avail  little  in  war  ;  and  the  disposable  wealth 
in  this  country,  that  which  can  be  readily  converted  to  the  purposes 
of  war,  is  not  proportionately  great.  Our  increased  capital  is  chiefly 
vested  in  improved  lands,  manufactories,  public  works,  &,c.  And 
though  these  would  enable  us  to  raise  more  revenue  by  taxation, 
they  would  not  be  available  to  supply  the  immediate  wants  of  gov- 
ernment in  the  commencement  of  a  war — they  would  not  increase  the 
power  of  loaning  to  the  State.  And  in  such  a  war  as  we  should  be 
obliged  to  wage  with  England,  no  other  means  but  loans  could  ade- 
quately supply  our  urgent  demands. 

Again,  Engl?"d  is  prepared  and  ready  for  hostilities  at  any  mo- 
ment, and  could  therefore  support  a  war  with  us  for  a  long  time 
without  increasing  her  present  burdens  or  her  present  debt  in  any 
alarming  degree.  She  possesses  a  navy  immensely  larger  than  any 
which  we  can  hope  to  command  ;  to  which  she  can  add  any  desira- 
We  increase  by  the  employment  of  the  steam  packets  already  con- 
structed with  reference  to  this  purpose.  We,  on  the  contrary,  are 
wholly  unprepared  for  a  contest  single-handed  with  such  an  antago- 
nist. And  before  we  should  be  adequately  prepared  to  begin,  as 
happened  in  1814,  we  should  all,  even  the  most  pugnacious  among 
us,  be  heartily  tired  of  the  contest. 

Next,  I  would  notice  a  fact   whichf  though  not  wholly  unob- 


'f 


iphlet  of  Mr. 

ed   power  of 
sengaged  that 
know  it  is  the 
ngland  as  de- 
il  debt.     The 
)e  a  great  and 
and — and  an 
roided,  if  pos- 
this,  England 
has  more  dis- 
ly  past  period 
upon  her,  this 
ose  of  annoy- 
3  be  admitted 
in  wealth  and 
England.    But 
losable  wealth 
0  the  purposes 
pita!  is  chiefly 
,  &:.c.     And 
by  taxation, 
wants  of  gov- 
it  increase  the 
Iwe  should  be 
IS  could  ade- 


)s  at  any  mo- 
Ir  a  long  time 
debt  in  any 
[ger  than  any 
|d  any  desira- 

already  con- 
[contrary,  are 

ih  an  antago- 
to  begin,  as 

^cious  among 

wholly  unob- 


43 

ierved,  is  not  sufiiciently  attended  to  in  the  calculations  of  our  over- 
sanguine  fellow-citizens.  It  is  that  this  country  has  been  almost 
invariably  unsuccessful  in  all  attempts  at  aggressive  war.  Witness 
the  failure  in  the  attempt  to  take  Canada  in  the  revolutionary  war  ; 
the  failure  in  a  similar  attempt  in  the  war  of  1812,  contrary,  no 
doubt,  to  general  expectation  in  this  country,  and  contrary,  as  I 
know,  to  very  general  expectation  in  Britain.  Witness  the  very 
sanguinary,  protracted  and  expensive  war  a  few  years  ago,  with  a 
miserable  handful  of  Indians  in  Florida.  These  failures  are  all  at- 
tributable, in  part  at  least,  to  the  same  cause — the  impediments 
^hich  the  past  and  present  state  of  the  country  presents  to  military 
operations.  In  a  country  so  covered  with  forests  as  the  United 
States  and  Canada  still  are,  an  invading  party  would  need  to  be  ex- 
ceedingly strong  and  well  provided  with  warlike  supplies  and  means 
of  conveyance  to  make  any  great  impression  on  a  civilized  foe,  or  to 
penetrate  to  any  distance  into  the  interior,  with  assurance  of  main- 
taining its  footing.  Almost  every  campaign  in  this  country,  whether 
in  the  old  French  wars,  in  the  revolutionary  war,  or  in  the  last  war 
with  Great  Britain,  affords  illustration  of  this  truth.  Similar  fortune 
has  attended  all  the  attempts  of  England  to  penetrate  far  into  the 
interior  in  her  struggles  with  this  comitry.  Witness  Burgoyne's 
invasion  from  the  north,  Cornwallis's  invasion  of  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia,  &c.,  and,  in  the  last  war,  the  foolish  and  wanton  attack  on 
Washington  and  Baltimore,  and  the,  perhaps,  equally  absurd  and 
still  more  disastrous  (to  the  aggressors)  attack  on  New-Orleans. 

By  the  way,  there  is  a  lesson  worth  learning  to  be  derived  from 
these  facts,  in  regard  to  the  probable  disasters  which  may  attend  a 
war  with  Mexico.  Tiie  difficulties  and  dangers  of  such  a  war  are, 
in  my  opinion,  much  underrated  by  the  good  people  of  these  States. 
They  look  to  the  field  of  San  Jacinto,  instead  of  the  Everglades  of 
Florida,  for  indications  of  the  results  of  a  contest  with  the  Mexicans. 
They  forget  that  the  Camanches  may  prove  as  formidable  enemies, 
if  they  should  unite  with  the  Mexicans,  as  the  miserable  remnant  of 
the  Seminoles.  They  forget  that  Santa  Ana,  too,  was  an  invader^ 
and  that  his  case  is  another  striking  example  of  the  results  of  all 
aggressive  warfare  in  a  country  like  that  which  lies  bf^tween  the 
United  States  and  Mexico.  Besides,  it  is  forgotten  that  the  result 
of  the  buttle  of  San  Jacinto  did  not  depend  altogether  on  the  valor 
of  the  Texan  party,  nor  on  the  inefficiency  or  cowardice  of  their  op- 
l^nents,  but  much  more  on  casualties  and  blunders,  and  on  the  reck- 


44 


•«t 


,.P! 


less  contempt  of  the  Mexican  chief  and  the  Mexican  army  for  an 
enemy  whom  they  supposed  to  be  utterly  inctipable  of  fucing  them 
in  battle,  whom  they  considered  as  flying  before  them  routed  and 
dismayed,  and  whom  they  coiiaequenlly  expected  to  drive  without 
resistance  out  of  their  territory.  A  casuahy  such  as  the  Texans  im- 
proved to  the  establishment  of  their  independence  might  never  occur 
again ;  a  mistake  or  blunder  of  the  same  description  is  not  likely  to 
be  repeated  by  the  Mexicans,  especially  in  a  struggle  with  the  United 
States. 

In  considering  the  probable  results  of  a  war  with  any  nation, 
when  we  sit  down  beforehand  to  count  the  costs,  we  ought  never  to 
calculate  on  the  casualties  which  have  heretofore   favored  us;  nor 
to  expect  that  mistakes  made  by  our  opponents  on  former  occasions 
will  be  again  repeated.     A  wise  statesman,  in  drawing  conclusions 
from  the  past,  will  exclude  all  such  matters  from  his  calculations; 
or,  rather,  will  make  allowance  for  a  large  share  of  the  casualties  of 
war  proving  unfavorable  to  his  country.     For  instance,  a  prudent 
man,  in  forming  an  estimate  of  the  probable  success  of  another  war 
with  Great  Britain,  would  leave  out  of  his  account  such  aflfuirs  ^s  the 
victory  on  Lake  Erie,  the  victory  on  Lake  Champlain,  and  the  vic- 
tory of  General  Jackson  at  New-Orleans ;  and  also  several  of  the 
victories  at  sea  during  the  war.     So  far  as  any  of  these  victories  was 
determined  by  unforeseen  casualties,  he  could  not  safely  depend  on 
the  recurrence  of  these  casualties.     And  so  far  as,  on  the  one  hand, 
they  were  occasioned  by  the  foolish   contempt  entertained   by  the 
British  of  American  prowess  and  skill,  or  by  the  manifest  blunders 
of  the  British  leaders;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the  peculiar  saga- 
city and  intrepidity  of  individual  American  leaders,  it  would  not  be 
safe  for  him  to  expect  a  repetition  of  the  reckless  contempt  atid  blun- 
ders on  the  one  side,  or  of  the  same  extraordinary  personal  intre- 
pidity on  the  other.     Now,  were  the  proper  deductions  made  for 
every  thing  of  the  kind  which  we  have  mentioned,  what  encourage- 
ment, in  entering  upon  a  new  war,  could  be  fairly  drawn  from  the 
last  war  ?     Suppose  the  casualties  shoidd   be  against  us,  especially 
at  the  beginning  of  the  contest — that  our  ships  of  war  shouhl,  for  a 
length  of  time,  be  so  unforluate  as  to  encounter  always  a  decidedly 
superior  force,  and  that  our  commanders  should  be  filled  with  as 
much  vanity  and   contempt  of  their  adversaries  as  the  British  in 
1812,  (a  thing  not  altogether  unlikely  to  happen;)  that  the  intrepid 
Perry,  and  Decatur,  and  Jackson  have  dropped  their  mantles,  when 


45 


irmy  for  an 
facing  them 
routed  and 
rive  without 
!  Texans  im- 
,  never  occur 
not  likely  to 
;h  the  United 

any  nation, 
iffht  never  to 
)red  us;  nor 
ler  occasions 
;  conclusions 
calcuhitions ; 
;  casualties  of 
ce,  a  prudent 
'  another  war 
1  affairs  '^s  the 
,  and  the  vic- 
everal  of  the 
'  victories  was 
ly  depend  on 
the  one  hand, 
ained   by  the 
lifest  blunders 
[jeculiar  saga- 
would  not  be 
mpt  and  blun- 
►ersonul  intre- 
ons  made  for 
lat  encourage- 
awn  from  the 
L  us,  especially 
r  should,  for  a 
ys  a  decidedly 
filled   with  as 
the  British  in 
at  the  intrepid 
mantles,  when 


departing,  on  no  worthy  successors;  and  that  our  recklessness  and 
confidence  generated  by  the  exnggeratcd  statements  of  our  success 
in  the  last  war — which  statements,  unaccompanied  with  any  of  the 
humiliating  reverses  in  that  war,  have  ever  since  been  incessantly 
dinned  in  our  ears — should  betray  us  into  some  serious  blunders, 
and  bring  on  us  a  few  such  signal  defeats  as  befell  the  British  in  the 
last  war:  would  not  in  this  case  our  vainglorious  boasting  be 
speedily  changed  into  national  dejection,  and  weariness  of  a  war 
without  glory,  but  not  without  its  accompanying  burdens  of  tax- 
ation 1 

I  know  well  the  answer  which  would  be  made  to  this  by  our  bold 
Bobadils,  our  thunderbolts  of  war.  They  would  say  that  such  re- 
verses, in  the  commencement  of  the  contest,  would  only  serve  to 
screw  u|)  the  national  courage,  and  render  the  people  desperate,  and 
confirm  the  determination  to  dispossess  the  Britisli  of  every  foot  of 
the  soil  of  this  continent  before  the  sword  should  be  sheathed.  This 
kind  of  talk  sounds  very  fine,  but  yet  it  is  mere  froth  and  gasconade. 
It  is  flatly  contradicted  by  the  experience  of  these  men's  fathers — 
not  less  brave,  though  perhaps  less  presumptuous  than  themselves — 
in  the  last  war;  and  that  a  war  attended  with  no  very  fatal  reverse 
to  the  arms  of  this  country,  though  with  great  fiiilure  of  success  in 
achieving  the  manifest  objects  of  the  struggle.  Even  the  cabinet 
became  sick  of  the  war,  as  well  as  the  tax-payers  and  the  contribu- 
tors to  the  public  loans;  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia  was  induced — 
Mr.  J.  Q,.  Adams  perhaps  knows  how — to  offer  his  mediation,  and 
prevent  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  struggle  during  another 
campaign,  the  probable  results  of  which  were  an  object  of  deep  ap- 
prehension to  the  government  at  Washington,  as  well  as  to  peace- 
loving  people  all  over  the  country.  That  the  Emperor  should  of  his 
own  mere  will  have  proposed  his  kind  services  to  adjust  the  quarrel 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in  1812,  when  Napoleon 
was  invading  his  dominions,  and  England  his  only  reliable  friend 
I  can  readily  believe.  But  by  what  means  he  was  induced  to  offer 
his  mediation  at  a  later  period,  Mr.  Adams,  as  I  have  said  before 
can  best  tell.  And  1  do  not  believe  that  he  told  all  that  he  could  tell 
on  this  subject,  when  he  discoursed  upon  it  the  other  day,  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Rhett. 

Again,  let  us  consider  for  a  moment  the  extent  of  the  war,  into 
which  our  prudent  Executive  seems  willing,  and  some  of  our  pru- 
dent legislators  seem  inclined  to  nlimore  ..s.     I  do  not  believe  that 


.^i.*-;-ji.' 


il^f 


46 

Great  Britain  would  make  any  attempt  to  penetrate  into  any  part  of 
this  country.  It  would  certainly  be  very  unwise  for  her  to  do  so — 
as  hazardous,  or  rather  much  more  hazardous  than  it  has  proved  on 
former  occasions.  This  country  is  undoubtedly  much  stronger  to 
resist  such  aggressions  than  ever  she  was  in  any  former  struggle 
with  Great  Britain.  Such  attempts  to  penetrate  into  the  country, 
wherever  made,  would  most  likely  prove  disastrous  to  any  foreign 
foe.  In  this  point  of  view,  this  country  is  mighty — impregnable; 
but  her  resources  for  aggressive  war,  as  I  have  stated  above,  are 
increased  neither  in  the  same  ratio  with  the  increase  of  her  popula- 
tion, nor  of  her  wealth.  Nor  do  they  admit  of  being  so  increased, 
without  the  expenditure  of  much  capital,  and  much  time  in  forming 
and  training  u  large  regular  army.  More  ca{)ilal  and  more  time  would 
be  necessary  for  this  purpose,  than  would  be  sufficient  to  tire  the 
patience  even  of  the  lovers  of  military  glory,  and  much  more  the 
lovers  of  peace  and  of  commercial  pursuits. 

The  power  of  our  formidable  opponent  would  likely  enough  be 
directed  against  some  of  the  cities  on  the  sea-board — certainly  against 
our  commerce.*     But,  above  all,  the  most  vigorous  efforts  would  be 


'ii  11 


I"'  fi 


*The  eflccts  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  as  regards  the  weahh  of  the  country, 
would  be  extremely  disastrous,  and  deeply  felt  by  a  large  portion  of  our  citizens. 
Our  foreign  connnerce  would  be  nearly  annihilated.  Consequently  a  great  propor- 
tion of  those  engaged  in  this  pursuit  would  be  ruined.  All  kinds  of  property  in 
the  great  commercial  cities  would  be  miserably  depressed.  And  the  calamity  would 
of  course  reach  to  the  laboring  class  in  these  cities,  who  depend  on  commerce  for 
employment,  and  would  produce  all  the  distress  which  the  necessity  of  changing 
their  occupations  and  their  place  of  residence  involves. 

Again,  a  war  would  seriously  injure  the  industry  of  the  Southern  States.  This 
is  well  understood,  and  therefore  needs  the  less  notice  here.  I  believe  this  evil  is 
sometimes  exaggerated.  The  cottoir  must  still  find  its  way  to  Great  Bri'a.n. 
Were  we,  as  some  are  perhaps  ready  to  recommend,  in  case  of  war,  to  decla-e  u 
non-intercourse,  in  order  to  cripple  our  opponent,  it  would  bring  us  into  collision 
with  other  European  powers,  and  especially  with  France.  But  still  a  war  with 
England  would,  no  doubt,  greatly  reduce  the  price  which  the  planter  would  receive 
for  his  cotton.  This  would  impose  on  him  the  necessity  of  raising  a  larger  propor- 
tion of  his  own  supplies  at  home,  and  would  thus  directly  curtail  the  maiket  of  some 
of  the  Western  States,  and,  co-operating  with  the  obstacles  to  exportation,  reduce 
the  price  of  the  productions  of  the  Western  States  in  general.  The  demand  for  sup- 
plying the  armies  on  the  north-western  borders,  might,  in  some  degree,  counterbal- 
ance this  diminished  demand  from  other  quarters.  But,  on  the  whole,  the  regular 
and  steady  demand  for  the  productions  of  the  west,  contrary  to  the  expectations  of 
the  western  people  themselves,  would  most  likely  be  greatly  reduced,  and,  more 


47 


any  part  of 
to  do  so — 
3  proved  on 
stronger  to 
er  struggle 
he  country, 
any  foreign 
ipregnable; 
1  above,  are 
lier  popula- 
o  increased, 
i  in  forming 
B  time  would 
t  to  tire  the 
ch  more  the 

y  enough  be 
ainly  against 
>rts  would  be 

f the  country, 

our  citizens. 

great  propor- 

f  property  in 

calamity  would 

coniinerce  for 

y  of  changing 

States.     This 

ve  this  evil  is 

Great  Bri'a.n. 

,  to  declare  i 

into  collision 

1  a  war  with 

would  receive 

larger  propor- 

maiket  of  some 

rtation,  reduce 

cniand  for  sup- 

ee,  counterbal- 

le,  the  regular 

expectations  of 

ced,  and,  more 


made  to  secure,  if  possible,  the  complete  ascendency  on  the  lakes. 
Steam  navigation  would  give  immensely  greater  advantages  to  the 
party  holding  litis  Oi^cendency,  than  could  have  been  obtained  without 
it.     If  by  a  great  efTort  at  first — and  this  great  effort  Britain  is  pre- 
pared, and,  no  doubt,  determined  to  make — she  could  attain  this 
important  object,  she  might  safely  defy  all  our  attacks  on  her  Cana- 
dian possessions,  till  we  had  spent  twice  as  much  money  as  in  the 
last  war,  and  perhaps  twice  as  much  time.     Even  then  the  Canadas 
could  not  be  invaded  with  safety,  or  any  assurance  of  success,  for 
their  inhabitants  would  before  that  time  have  become  a  nation  of 
warriors,  as  capable  of  opposing  this  country,  as  it  was  capable  of 
opposing  the  colossal  power  of  the  mother  country  in  the  war  of  the 
revolution — especially  when  these  provinces  should  be  backed,  as 
they  would  be,  by  British  capital  and  British  valor.     Should  the  war 
take  this  turn,  it  might  probably  bring  some  of  our  western  dema- 
gogues to  their  senses;  inasmuch  as  it  would  cut  off  the  commercial 
resources  of  some  portion  of  the  territory   of  the   northwestern 
States,  by  interrupting  all  intercourse  through  the  lakes  with  the 
seaboard.* 

especially,  if  the  British  should  obtain  the  ascendency  on  the  lakes,  and  thus  ob- 
struct the  intercourse  with  the  Atlantic  cities. 

The  efTects  of  the  destruction  of  foreign  commerce  on  the  revenue  of  the  country 
are  obvious.  The  duties  on  importation  would  be  comparatively  unproductive. 
Direct  taxes  of  an  onerous  description  must  be  imposed  and  paid,  when  the  means 
of  paying  would  be  greatly  diminished  by  the  restriction  or  destruction  of  our  usual 
markets.  If  both  parties  should  become  desperate,  and  pursue  the  war  long  and  per- 
tinaciously, capitalists  may  anticipate  that  forced  loans,  either  direct,  or  in  the  shape 
of  depreciated  government  paper,  would  necessarily  bj  resorted  to — both  would, 
likely  enough,  be  tried  ;  and  the  results  might  deeply  shake  the  public  confidence  in 
the  permanency  of  our  institutions,  and  entail  the  most  disastrous  political  conse- 
qnences.  A  vast  national  debt  is  obviously  an  inevitable  consequence  of  a  pro- 
tracted war.  For  the  more  full  consideration  of  this  and  kindred  subjects,  I  have 
already  referred  to  Mr.  Gallatin.  I  would  now  also  refer  to  the  speech  of  Mr.  Cal- 
houn, delivered  since  the  above  sentences  were  written.  His  anticipations  of  the 
enormous  amount  of  debt  likely  to  be  contracted,  in  case  the  war  should  last  ten 
years,  are,  I  believe,  nearer  the  mark  than  Mr.  Gallatin's.  But  there  is  not,  as  I 
shall  show  before  I  close,  the  least  probability  of  such  a  protracted  contest. 

*  Query.  Does  not  a  wish  to  get  rid  of  the  payment  of  their  debts  due  to  foreign 
capitalists,  by  means  of  a  war,  influence  selfish,  dishonest  men  in  the  Western  States, 
in  their  manifest  eflTorts  to  disturb  the  peaceful  relations  of  this  country  and  Great 
Britain  ?  I  fear  that  the  course  of  some  western  men  in  this  matter,  is  rather  attrib- 
ilable  to  this  dishonorable  motive,  than  to  all  the  "  annoyances  and  collisions"  to 


m 


48 

Again,  it  is  obvious  from  the  present  state  of  our  relations  with 
Mexico  that,  if  we  have  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  we  shall  certainly 
have  a  war  at  the  same  time  with  Mexico.  A  war  with  this  latter 
country  we  arc  likely  enough  to  have  at  any  rate;  and  even  this,  as 
we  have  already  hinted,  may  give  us  more  to  keep  our  hands  em- 
ployed, and  to  drain  our  pockets,  than  many  people  suppose,  espe- 
cially if  it  should  be  managed  by  us  in  the  Florida  style,  or  as  the 
war  on  the  frontiers  of  Upper  Canada  was  managed  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  last  contest  with  Great  Britain,  But,  in  case  we 
have  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  a  war  at  the  same  lime  with  Mexico 
would  be  a  very  serious  additional  calamity.  Mexico,  protected  by 
British  naval  armaments  from  an  attack  in  the  gulf  of  Mexico, 
and  assisted  by  British  treasure  and  British  skill,  would  be  a  much 
more  dangerous  antagonist  than  Mexico  single-handed  and  unaided. 
She  could,  by  distracting  our  efforts,  render  immense  service  to  her 
ally.  Besides  this,  we  might  calculate  on  all  the  Indians  on  our 
western  and  northwestern  frontiers  as  bitter  enemies,  and  perhaps 
on  some  within  our  territories,  who  are  far  from  being  satisfied  with 
the  treatment  which  they  have  in  many  instances  received  from  the 
government  at  Washington.* 

In  enumerating  the  dangers  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain  for  the 
whole  of  Oregon,  I  might  notice  the  temper  and  feelings  with  which 
both  nations  would  enter  into  the  contest.  This  country  must  ob- 
viously enter  into  it  a  divided  people.  A  large  and  most  respectable 
portion  of  the  community  feel  persuaded  of  the  injustice  and  the 


'!    ilil; 


which,  Mr.  Gallatin  says,  they  have  been  "  personally  exposed,"  and  which,  I 
think,  he  somewhat  exaggerates.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  ihat  in  most  serious  col- 
lisions which  have  happened  on  the  borders,  the  citizens  of  this  country  have  been 
the  aggressors. 

*  I  leave  out  of  the  account  altogether  the  difficulties  which  would  attend  an 
attempt  to  maintain  our  ground  in  Oregon,  as  no  such  attempt  would  likely  be 
made.  The  defence  of  that  territpvy,  and  of  the  settlers  in  it,  would  have  to  be 
entirely  abandoned.  Mr.  Calhoun's  opinions — of  the  efficiency  of  the  Mexicans  as 
allies  of  Great  Britain,  of  the  impossibility  of  defending  Oregon,  and  of  the  dangers 
arising  from  incursions  of  the  Indians  on  our  northwestern  borders — presented  in 
his  speech  in  the  Senate  since  the  above  was  written,  are  much  stronger  and  more 
decided  than  those  which  I  had  ventured  to  assert.  The  views  exhibited  on  these 
and  on  kindred  matters  in  Mr.  Calhoun's  speech  ought,  both  on  account  of  their 
own  intrinsic  importance,  and  the  great  intelligence,  experience  and  respectability 
of  their  author,  to  produce,,  and  no  doubt  will  produce,  a  deep  impression  on  all 
considerate  men. 


49 


relations  with 
shall  certainly 
ilh  tliis  latter 
[1  even  this,  as 
)iir  hands  em- 
suppose,  espi- 
tyle,  or  as  the 
?d  during  the 
lut,  in  case  we 
e  with  Mexico 
,  protected  by 
If  of  Mexico, 
Id  be  a  much 
1  and  unaided, 
service  to  her 
ndians  on  our 
:<,  and  perhaps 
r  satisfied  with 
eived  from  the 

Britain  for  the 
iffs  with  which 
nritry  must  ob- 
ost  respectable 
isticc  and  the 

d,"  and  which,  I 
most  serious  col- 
ountry  have  been 

would  attend  an 

would  likely  he 

vould  have  to  be 

the  Mexicans  as 

nd  of  the  dangers 

ers — presented  in 

ronger  and  more 

xhibited  on  these 

account  of  their 

nd  respectability 

mpression  on  all 


folly  of  a  course,  which  should  precipitate  us  into  such  a  conflict 
They  consider  war,  even  when  necessary  for  the  defence  of  the 
property  or  the  honor  of  the  nation,  as  a  great  and  deplorable 
calamity.  But  such  a  war  as  this  for  the  wilds  of  Oregon,  they 
regard  as  not  only  disastrous  to  the  lives  and  property  of  themselves 
and  their  fellow-citizens,  but,  at  the  same  time,  a  reproach  to  the 
national  character — a  reproach  to  republican  institutions.  Let  it  be 
remembered,  that  among  those  who  thus  regard  the  war,  are  in- 
cluded the  vast  majority,  if  not  the  whole  of  the  parties,  who  control 
the  disposable  capital  of  the  country — the  very  parties  on  which 
the  government,  in  such  an  emergency,  must  depend,  in  a  great 
measure,  for  the  supply  of  the  immense  expenditure  necessary  to 
maintain  such  a  conflict.  Most  of  these  persons  would  feel  very 
reluctant  to  assist  the  government  in  what  they  consider  an  unjust, 
impolitic,  unnecessary  and  shameful  war.  Patriotism  (and  in  this, 
I  think,  they  are  at  least  not  behind  the  noisy  vainglorious  dema- 
gogues who  urge  us  on  to  war,)  would,  no  doubt,  impel  them  to 
lend  all  the  assistance  possible,  in  cas  their  country  were  menaced 
with  invasion,  to  maintain  a  defensive  Vvar  ;  but  they  would  feel  un- 
willing to  assist  in  making  aggressive  war  in  such  a  cause,  and  they 
would,  by  their  party  action,  impede  the  efforts  of  the  executive. 
Besides  this,  it  is  to  be  apprehended  that  there  is  a  party  among  us 
— not  altogether  despicable  as  to  numbers — who  would  rejoice  in 
the  calamities  which  might  befall  their  country  in  such  a  contest,  as 
being  the  means,  in  their  opinion,  of  hastening  the  accomplishment 
of  greater  good — as  conducing  to  the  more  complete  extension  of 
liberty  and  equal  rights  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  these  States  of 
every  color.  All  these  circumstances  would  tend  less  or  more  to 
paralyze  the  arm  of  government  in  the  maintenance  of  a  war  for  the 
whole  of  Oregon. 

Let  us  now  look  to  Great  Britain.  If  forced  into  a  contest  with 
this  country  on  this  subject,  in  order  to  defend  her  national  reputa- 
tion, she  would  engage  in  the  conflict  with  the  unaniuious  and 
cordial  approbation  of  all  men  of  all  parties  who  have  any  decisive 
influence  over  her  counsels,  and  with  the  energetic  co-operation  of 
her  wealthy  and  industrious  classes.  Her  people  would  engage  in 
the  war  with  feelings  of  the  strongest  indignation  against  our 
government  on  account  of  what  they  consider  the  injustice,  inso- 
lence and  unreasonableness  of  the  course  which  it  has  pursued  as 


li 


"I  I 


llii! 


,!l 


ijl  i 


I  )l 


I 


50 

regards  the  immediate  subject  of  dispute.     Besides,  many  in  Britiin 
still  feel  greatly  exasperated  nt  the  bad  faith  displayed  by  the  re- 
pudiating States.     Add  to  this  the  strong  feeling  uf  hatred  (whether 
reasonable  or  unreasonable  it  matters  not  in  this  connexion),  to  our 
system  of  negro  slavery — a  feeling  pervading  a  very  large  and  in- 
fluential portion  of  the  British  people — and  we  have  elements  which, 
combined,  would  render  certain  a  more  vigorous  and  determined 
and  unrelenting  prosecution  of  hostilities  against  this  country  than 
in  any  former  war.     Even  the  contemplation  of  the  violence  of  the 
conflict  is  sufficient  to  make  any  sane  man  shudder.     The  people  of 
Great  Britain  would  regard  the  war  as  a  direful,  but  inevitable 
calamity  ;  and  every  effort  would  be  made  to  shorten  its  duration  by 
putting  fojrth  at  the  beginning  of  the  contest  all  the  energies  of  the 
nation,  in  order  to  induce  her  opponent  to  a  speedy  reconciliation 
on  reasonable  terms.     In  such  a  contest,  so  provoked,  there  is  not 
the  least  grounds  to  hope  that  Britain  would,  on  her  part,  yield  till 
she  should  be  driven  from  all  her  possessions  on  this  continent,  and 
it  is  doubtful  whether  even  then  she  would  be  disposed  to  yield. 

Suppose,  that  in  such  a  desperate  and  protracted  struggle, 
this  country  should  succeed  to  the  utmost  extent  of  the  sangu'ne 
anticipations  of  some  of  our  demagogues,  the  consequences  v  ^ 
likely,  in  the  end,  prove  more  disastrous  to  us  than  a  severe  del. 

But  from  a  protracted  struggle  with  Great  Britain,  is  there  any 
fiolid  reason  whatever  to  anticipate  success,  and  not  rather  defeat  in 
war,  and  as  regards  our  internal  affairs,  what  is  still  worse,  bitter, 
implacable  political  strife  and  recrimination,  disorganization  of  our 
government  and  dismemberment  of  the  Union  ? 

Now,  suppose  that  Great  Britain  should  come  out  of  the  contest 
shorn  of  her  greatness,  bumbled,  and  showing  evident  symptoms 
that  she  was  hastening  to  the  final  eclipse  of  her  former  glory,  as 
some  of  our  bigoted  and  vainglorious  ultra-democrats  hope,  and  in 
their  ravings  predict,  still  she  would  leave  a  name  splendid  in  the 
annals  of  the  world.  But  should  this  nation,  by  the  struggle, 
(whether  through  success  or  r^.efeat,)  bring  upon  herself,  as  it  is 
possible  that  she  might  in  case  the  contest  should  be  long  protracted, 
premature  destruction,  the  dismemberment  of  her  confederacy,  a 
military  despotism,  or  a  state  of  anarchy  and  misrule,  and  conse- 
quent exposure  to  the  frequent  recurrence  of  revolutions,  like  those 
*  See  Mr.  Calhoun's  late  speech  for  a  forcible  exposition  of  some  of  the  evile 
likely  to  result  from  a  successful  struggle  with  Great  Britain  and  Mexico. 


51 


iny  in  Britiin 
ed  by  the  re- 
tred  (whether 
exion),  to  our 
large  and  in- 
jments  which, 
d  determined 
country  than 
iolence  of  the 
rhe  people  of 
)ut  inevitable 
ts  duration  by 
lergies  of  the 
reconciliation 
,  there  is  not 
sart,  yield  till 
continent,  and 
i  to  yield, 
ted  struggle, 
the  sanguine 
luences  v  ^ 
evere  del.  .. 
is  there  any 
ther  defeat  in 
worse,  bitter, 
zation  of  our 

3f  the  contest 

3nt  symptoms 

mer  glory,  as 

hope,   and  in 

lendid  in  the 

the  struggle, 

rself,  as  it  is 

»g  protracted, 

jnfederacy,  a 

!,  and  conse- 

ns,  like  those 

3me  of  the  evils 
[exico. 


which  are  the  curse  of  the  southern  republics  of  this  continent,  she 
would  fall  from  her  high  station  with  disgrace,  and  bring  reproach 
on  the  very  name  of  democracy.  Even  the  glory  of  the  fathers  of 
the  country  would  be  tarnished  by  the  folly  of  their  degenerate  sons, 
when  it  should  be  made  to  appear  that  they  had  shed  their  blood  in 
vain  to  establish  rational  freedom  in  this  western  world.  It  might 
then  be  tauntingly  inquired,  in  the  language  of  an  old  poet,  how 
came  you  to  ruin  thus  prematurely  so  large  and  prosperous  and 
promising  a  republic?  And  answered,  a  crop  of  demagogues 
sprung  up — silly,  reckless,  &,c.* 

.  But  though  I  speak  thus  in  answer  to  the  vainglorious  gasconade 
of  some  of  our  demagogues,  so  calculated  to  excite  against  us  strong 
feelings  of  contempt  abroad,  and  possibly  to  betray  us  into  measures 
ruinous  to  the  republic,  I  do  not  anticipate  any  such  extreme  re- 
sults from  a  war,  either  as  regards  Great  Britain  or  this  country. 
Viewing  the  matter  with  the  lights  of  history  and  experience,  and 
taking  into  consideration  the  changeful  temperament  of  that  por- 
tion of  our  people  most  influenced  by  the  war  spirit,  I  do  not  antici- 
pate a  protracted  struggle,  as  many  seem  to  do.  The  results  would 
probably  be  nearly  the  same  as  in  the  last  war.  We  would  find 
ourselves  utterly  baffled  in  every  attempt  to  make  an  impression  on 
the  possessions  of  our  opponents  ;  financial  difficulties  would  arise; 
tax  upon  tax  ;  and  weariness  of  war  even  among  some  of  those  who 
at  first  encouraged  war  measures.  An  Oregon  war  would  be  far 
more  unpopular  from  the  beginning  with  the  respectable  portion  of 
the  community,  and  especially  with  men  of  capital,  than  the  last  war. 
The  professions  about  going  into  the  contest,  if  once  war  were  de- 
clared, with  undivided  front,  are  all  humbug.  It  may  do  well  enough 
for  editors  of  papers  and  party  leaders  to  pledge  themselves  in  this 
manner  ;  but  will  the  people,  when  smarting  under  the  calamities 
of  war,  care  for  en''bling  them  to  redeem  these  pledges.  The  ad- 
ministration would  find  itself  involved  in  inextricable  embarrassment. 
Some  John  Q,.  Adams  would  receive  a  hint  to  jog  the  elbow  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  or  some  other  potentate — our  jealousy  of  poten- 
tates notwithstanding — and,  after  some  two  or  three  years  of  war,  we 

*  Cedo,  qui  vestram  rempublicam  tautam  amisistis  tam  cito  ? 
Proveniebant  oratores  novi  stulti  adolescentuli. 

"  I  have  more  faith  in  popular  nonsense,  than  in  the  selfish  second  thought  of 
the  wisest  man  in  the  world."  We  have,  it  seems,  not  only  "  stulti  oratores," 
Billy  reckless  demagogues,  but  panegyrists  of — "  nonsense." 


5S 


should  come  out  of  the  conflict,  minus  some  hundreds  of  millions  of 
war  expenses — with  the  loss  of  Oregon,  and  of  all  hope  of  gaining 
settlements  on  the  Pacific,  and  possibly  with  Texas  reduced  to  very 
reasonable  dimensions.  If  any  reader  of  these  pages  thinks  this 
result  unlikely,  let  him  divest  himself  for  a  momeni,  if  he  can,  of 
national  prejudices  and  national  vanity,  and  consider  attentively, 
with  the  aid  of  the  experience  of  the  past,  the  whole  prospect  ahead 
in  case  of  a  struuffle  single-handed  with  Great  Britain  and  Mexico  ; 
and  see  whether  he  can  come  to  a  different  conclusion  from  that  ex- 
pressed above.  Should  some  of  my  opinions  be  attributed  to  my 
foreign  prejudices  imbibed  in  youth,  and  which  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  century  spent  under  the  institutions  of  this  country  has  not 
sufficed  to  eradicate,  I  would  suggest  that  it  is  good  sometimes  to 
lool'.  on  a  subject  from  the  point  oT  view  which  even  a  declared  en- 
emy might  be  supposed  to  take. 


it!  • 


I 


Fas  et  ab  hoste  doceri. 

I  have  not  dwelt  on  the  calamities  which  such  a  war  would  in- 
flict urvon  Great  Britain  ;  not  because  they  r.re  of  small  importance, 
but  because  it  is  needless  to  expatiate  on  them  in  this  country.  The 
British  people  and  gijvernment  are  awake  to  a  sense  of  these  calami- 
ties ;  and  some  of  us  are  too  miich  engag<Ml  already  in  looking  to 
what  we  suppose  the  weak  points  of  Great  Britain,  and  in  exagger- 
ating them,  to  the  neglect  of  a  proper  consideration  of  our  own  pe- 
culiar unfitness  for  aggressive  war.  Many  indeed  seem  disposed  to 
dwell  exclusively  on  the  contemplation  of  the  weak  points  of  Great 
Britain,  and  on  the  supposed  strength  of  our  own  position,  grossly 
exawseratinw  both,  and  forgetting  alr>(iether  our  own  weak  side  and 
the  strong  side  of  our  antagonist — the  worst  possible  preparation  for 
a  struggle,  and  boding  only  disaster  and  humiliation. 

The  restlessness  and  disatTection  of  one  class  of  the  Irish  people 
is  considered  b-'  some  as  threatening  serious  danger  to  Great  Brit- 
ain  should  she  become  engaged  in  a  war  with  this  country.  This 
danger  has  been,  as  I  think,  greatly  exaggerated.  Those,  who  are 
intimately  acquainted  with  the  history  of  Britain  during  the  last 
sixty  years,  know  well  that  when  she  commenced  her  long  struggle 
with  the  Frencli  Republic  tlie  state  of  Irisli  aff'airs  threatened  more 
serious  danger  to  her  than  at  any  period  since.  Nearly  the  whole 
Irish  people — the  hardy  and  energetic  and  intelligent  Anglo-Saxon 


53 


millions  of 
of  gaining 
zed  iQ  very 
hinks  this 
he  can,  of 
attentively, 
pect  ahead 
d  Mexico ; 
am  that  ex- 
ted  to  my 
n  a  quarter 
ry  has   not 
Tietimes  to 
eclared  en- 


woiild  in- 
mportance, 
itry.  The 
ese  calami- 
looking  to 
in  exajTwer- 
ur  own  pe- 
Jisposed  to 
its  of  Great 
on,  grossly 
k  side  and 
)aration  for 

rish  people 
Great  Brit- 
itry.  This 
>e,  who  are 
ig  the  last 
ig  struggle 
:ened  more 
'  the  whole 
iglo-Saxon 


race  hi  the  north,  as  well  as  the  Celtic  race  of  the  south,  and  with 
them  a  large  portion  of  the  population  of  England  and  Scotland, 
openly  and  declaredly  sympathized  with  the  leaders  of  the  French 
revolution.  An  organization  embracing  a  vay  large  share  of  the 
talent  and  active  energies  of  Ireland  was  formed  and  ready  to  in- 
voke the  co-operation  of  France.  Yet  England  found  herself,  when 
engaged  in  a  desperate  foreign  struggle,  more  capable  of  putting 
down  resistance  at  home,  than  if  she  had  been  in  a  state  of  profound 
peace.  To  suppress  the  growing  spirit  of  disaffection  at  home  was, 
in  fact,  one  main  purpose  of  commencing  hostilities  with  France. 
The  application  of  these  historical  facts  to  the  present  case  is  obvi- 
ous. A  war  with  this  country,  accompanied  as  it  would  be  by 
the  embodiment  of  the  county  militia,  would  make  Great  Britam, 
for  the  time  being,  more  powerful  to  suppress  insurrection  in  her 
own  dominions.  But  what  cause  is  there  to  suppose  that  we  should 
have  in  this  conflict  the  sympathies  of  those  who  influence  most  the 
movements  of  the  disaffected  in  [reland  ?  They  feel  little  love  either 
for  our  people  or  our  institutions,  and  would  b*^  more  likely  to  de- 
nonnce  us  than  to  speak  or  act  in  our  favor.  A  time  of  war  they 
would  likely  find  less  propitious  than  a  period  of  peace  to  further  their 
objects  with  a  British  ministry.  It  has  been  in  times  of  tranquillity 
that  they  have  always  heretofore  obtained  the  most  important  con- 
cessiors. 

Ag  lin — it  is  intimated  by  some  that  France  might  take  advan- 
tage of  a  wsii  between  Britain  and  tliis  country  to  humble  her  an- 
cient rival.  But  whilst  England  pursues  her  present  course  of  pol- 
icy in  her  foreign  relations,  sl'.e  can  never  have  a  war  with  France, 
without  such  a  change  in  the  government  and  policy  of  the  latter 
country,  as  would  combine  all  the  powers  of  Europe  in  another  al- 
liance to  check  her  dangerous  ambition.  It  is  manifestly  the  policy 
of  the  present  dynasty  of  France,  to  maintain  the  most  friendly 
relations  with  Great  Britain.  This  policy  can  only  be  changed  by 
Jacobinism  once  more  obtaining  the  ascendenc  :,  And  even  were 
this  to  take  place,  England  would  have  little  rause  of  serious  appre- 
hension, since  such  an  occurrence  would  unite  all  Europe  to  oppose 
France,  and  to  oppose  her  with  much  more  energy  and  concert  of 
action  than  on  a  former  occasion.  But  I  need  not  dwell  on  this. 
It  is  obvious  already  to  every  man  of  sense,  who  has  attended  to  the 
plain  and  emphatic  language  of  M.  Guizot,  that,  in  a  war  with 
Great  Britain  on  account  of  Oregon,  this  country  has  nothing  to  ex- 


ii 


rT! 


f 


'^,tn 


64 

pect  from  the  sympathies  of  France,  and  our  antagonist  nothing  to 
fear  from  her  interference. 

Yours,  &c. 


P.  S. — When  I  commenced  these  letters,  nothing  in  the  form  of 
argument  had  yet  appeared  in  opposition  to  the  views  maintained  in 
Mr.  Polk's  Message  and  Mr.  Buchanan's  correspondence.  But  I 
am  happy  to  find  that  many  intelligent  men  of  all  parties,  whose  pa- 
triotism admits  of  no  question,  agree  with  me  in  the  most  essential 
points  maintained  in  the  preceding  pages,  and  have  anticipated  me 
— as  regards  much  of  the  matter  here  treated — before  the  public. 
Still,  notwithstanding  the  substantial  agreement  of  my  views  with 
those  of  the  respectable  men  to  whom  I  have  alluded,  the  intelligent 
reader  will  readily  discover  such  discrepancy,  even  as  regards  the 
subjects  which  we  have  treated  in  common,  as  gives  evidence  that 
these  views  of  the  Oregon  controversy,  and  the  arguments  by  which 
they  are  maintained,  are  not  a  mere  reflection  of  the  opinions  and 
arguments  of  others,  but  an  independent  testimony  to  the  soundness 
of  the  principles  which  \n°:  in  common  defend.  Besides,  there  is  a 
variety  of  matter  embraced  in  these  letters  which  has  not  as  yet,  so 
far  as  I  know,  been  brought  before  the  community  in  connexion 
with  this  discussion.  Were  it  otherwise,  I  should  not  think  it  expe- 
dient to  present  my  opinions  on  this  subject  to  the  public. 


iii 

1 

mj 


;  nothing  to 


;  the  form  of 
laintained  in 
nee.     But  I 
s,  whose  pa- 
)st  essentia) 
ticipated  me 
)  the  public, 
r  views  with 
lie  intelligent 
regards  the 
vidence  that 
nts  by  which 
opinions  and 
he  soundness 
es,  there  is  a 
lot  as  yet,  so 
n  connexion 
think  it  expe- 
ilic. 


